Information about Biometric Passport

Main article: Passport

A biometric passport is a combined paper and electronic identity document that uses biometrics to authenticate the citizenship of travellers. The passport's critical information is stored on a tiny RFID computer chip, much like information stored on smartcards. Like some smartcards, the passport book design calls for an embedded contactless chip that is able to hold digital signature data to ensure the integrity of the passport and the biometric data.

The currently standardized biometrics used for this type of identification system are facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, and iris recognition. These were adopted after assessment of several different kinds of biometrics including retinal scan. The International Civil Aviation Organisation defines the biometric file formats and communication protocols to be used in passports. Only the digital image (usually in JPEG or JPEG2000 format) of each biometric feature is actually stored in the chip. The comparison of biometric features is performed outside the passport chip by electronic border control systems (e-borders). To store biometric data on the contactless chip, it includes a minimum of 32 kilobytes of EEPROM storage memory, and runs on an interface in accordance with the ISO/IEC 14443 international standard, amongst others. These standards ensure interoperability between different countries and different manufacturers of passport books.

Types

European Union

European passports are planned to have digital imaging and fingerprint scan biometrics placed on the contactless chip. ^[1] This combination of the biometrics aims to create an unrivaled level of security and protection against counterfeit and fraudulent identification papers. Currently, the British biometric passport only uses a digital image and not fingerprinting, however this is being considered by the United Kingdom Passport Service. In Germany, two fingerprints will be stored on the chip beginning November 1st, 2007. In these EU nations, the price of the passport will be:

• Austria (available since 16 June 2006) An adult passport costs €69, while a chip-free child's version costs €26.
• Belgium (introduced in October 2004): €71 or €41 for children + local taxes. Passports are valid for 5 years.
• Czech Republic (available since 1 September 2006): 600 CZK for adults (valid 10 years), 100 CZK for kids (valid 5 years)
• Denmark (available since 1 August 2006): DKK 600, 155 DKK for under 18 and 350 DKK for over 65 (valid for 10 years).
• Estonia (available since 22 May 2007): EEK 450 (valid for 5 years)
• Finland (available since 21 August 2006) €46 (valid for max. 5 years)
• France (available since April 2006): €60 (valid for 10 years)
• Germany (available since November 2005): <=25 years (valid for 5 years) €37.50, >26 years (valid 10 years) €59.00
• Greece (available since 26 August 2006) €76,40 (valid for 5 years)
• Hungary (available since 29 August 2006): 6000 HUF (€24), valid for 5 years, 10000 HUF (€40) valid for 10 years.
• Ireland, Republic of (available since 16 October 2006): €75, valid for 10 years. Free for people over 65.
• Italy (available since 26 October 2006): €44.66 for 32 page book, €45.62 for 48 page book, valid for 10 years. http://www.poliziadistato.it/pds/cittadino/passaporto/pasbiometrico.htm
• Lithuaniahttp://www.dokumentai.lt/en/pass.htm (available since 28 August 2006) LTL 60 (€17)
• Netherlands (available since 28 August 2006): Approximately €11 on top of regular passport (€38.33) cost €49.33
• Poland (available since 28 August 2006): 140 PLN (€35) for adults, valid 10 years.
• Portugal (available since July 31 2006 - special passport; August 28 2006 - ordinary passport): €60 for adults (€50 for those who are over 65 years old), valid for 5 years. €40 for children under 12, valid for 2 years. All passports have 32 pages.
• Slovenia (available since 28 August 2006): €36 for adults, valid for 10 years. €31 for children from 3 to 18 years of age, valid for 5 years. €28 for children up to 3 years of age, valid for 3 years. All passports have 32 pages, a 48-page version is available at a €2 surcharge.
• Spain (available since 28 August 2006) at a price of €16.50. There are plans to include fingerprints of both index fingers in three years time. (Aged 30 or less a Spanish passport is valid for 5 years, otherwise they remain valid for 10 years).
• Sweden (available since October 2005): SEK 400 (valid for 5 years)
• UK (introduced March 2006 http://www.passport.gov.uk/general_biometrics.asp) £72 for adults and £46 for children under the age of 16.) http://www.passport.gov.uk/fees.asp.

None of the issued biometric passports mentioned above include fingerprints as of August 2007.

Australian

See also:

The Australian biometric passport was introduced in October 2005. Like the U.S. version, the chip will only have a digital image of the bearer's face as on their passport photo. Airport security has been upgraded to allow Australian ePassport bearers to clear immigration controls more rapidly, and face recognition technology has been installed at immigration gates.^[2]

Canadian

See also:

Canada has recently introduced biometrics in the use of passports with the help of digitized photos. The future passports may contain a chip that holds a picture of the person and personal information such as name and date of birth.

This technology is being used at border crossings that have electronic readers that are able to read the chip in the cards and verify the information present in the card and on the passport. This method aims at increasing efficiency and accuracy of identifying people at the border crossing. CANPASS, developed by Canada Border Services Agency, is currently being used by some major airports that have kiosks set up to take digital pictures of a person’s eye as a means of identification. [1]

Republic of China (Taiwan)

See also:

Available since late 2008 and costing NT$1,200 (Chinese) [2]

Icelandic

See also:

Available since 23 May 2006 and costing ISK 5100 (ISK 1900 for under 18 and over 67).

Iranian

On July 1st, 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affaires of Iran announced that the Diplomatic Biometric Passports will be issued on July 10 this year. Personal and Special passports are planned to be unveild in mid 2008.

Hong Kong SAR

See also:

The Hong Kong Immigration Department has, from 5 February 2007, introduced the electronic Passport (e-Passport) and electronic Document of Identity for Visa Purposes (e-Doc/I) which are compliant with the standard of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Digital data including holder's personal data and facial image will be contained in the contactless chip embedded in the back cover of e-Passport and e-Doc/I.

Applications for the HKSAR e-Passport & e-Doc/I will be accepted as from 5 February 2007. Application fees & procedures will remain unchanged. The Immigration Department pledges to complete the process of an application within 10 working days. For children under 11 year of age not holding a Hong Kong permanent identity card, the processing time is 19 working days. Existing HKSAR Passports and Documents of Identity for Visa Purposes will remain valid until their expiry. [3]

Macedonian

Available since 2 April 2007 and costing 1500 MKD or c. €25.

Malaysian

See also:

Malaysia is not a member of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and its biometric passport does not conform to the same standards as the VWP biometric document.

New Zealand

See also:

Like Australia or the USA, New Zealand is using the facial biometric identifier. There are two identifying factors - the small symbol on the front cover indicating that an electronic chip has been embedded in the passport, and the polycarbonate leaf in the back of the book inside which the chip is located.

Pakistani

See also:

The Directorate General Immigration & Passports of Ministry of Interior, Pakistan introduced Multi Biometric Passport on 25 October 2004. The passport is issued by [4] National Database Registration Authority through 25 Regional Passport Offices within Pakistan and 10 Foreign Missions are now equipped with Machine Readable Passport System and Machine Readable Passports are being issued from these sites.

Singaporean

See also:

The Immigation & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) of Singapore has introduced the Singapore Biometric Passport (BioPass) on 15 August 2006. Following this, Singapore has met requirements under the US Visa Waiver Programme which calls for countries to roll out their Biometric Passport before 26 October 2006 [5].

Swiss

See also:

The Swiss biometric passport has been available since 4 September 2006. It is still a pilot project and is optional. The RFID chip contains only the photo, fingerprints will be introduced when an EU standard is fixed. The price (250 SFr.) is roughly double the price of a normal passport. [6]

Thai

See also:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand introduced the first biometric passport for Diplomats and Government officials on 26 May 2005. From 1 June 2005, a limited quantity of 100 passports a day was issued for Thai citizens, however, on 1 August 2005 a full operational service was installed and Thailand became the first country in Asia to issue an ICAO compliant biometric passport.[7]

Ukrainian

See also:

Available since June 2007 and costing 170 UAH (about €25), valid for 10 years.^[3]

US

See also:

The U.S. version of the biometric passport (which is also referred to as an "Electronic Passport") has descriptive data and a digitized passport photo, but does not have fingerprint information placed onto the contactless chip. However, the chip used in the U.S. passport will be large enough (64 kilobytes) to allow it to contain additional biometric identifiers should the need arise in the future. The U.S. Department of State began issuing biometric passports to government officials and diplomats in early 2006. It began issuing regular biometic passports at its Colorado Passport Agency on August 14, 2006; though they still expect that nearly all new or renewed passports issued by the department to American citizens will be biometric by the end of 2006, other sources say it won't happen until mid-2007. [8] [9] [10] [11] Although a system able to perform a facial recognition match between the bearer and his or her image stored on the contactless chip is desired, it is unclear when such a system will be deployed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security at its ports of entry.^[4]

A high level of security became a top priority in late 2001 for the United States. This tightened security required border control to take steps in cracking down on counterfeit paper passports. In October 2004, the production stages of this high-tech passport commenced as the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) issued awards to the top bidders of the program. The awards totaled to roughly $1,000,000 for startup, development, and testing. The driving force of the initiative is the U.S. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (also known as the "Border Security Act"), which states that such smartcard IDs will be able to replace visas. As for foreigners traveling to the U.S., if they wish to enter U.S. visa-free under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), they are now required to possess machine-readable passports that comply with international standards. Additionally, for travelers holding a valid passport issued on or after October 26, 2006, such a passport must be a biometric passport if used to enter the U.S. visa-free under the VWP.

Venezuelan

See also:

Issued after July 2007, RFID chip has photo and fingerprints[12]

Opposition

Privacy activists in many countries question and protest the lack of information about exactly what the passports' chip will contain, and whether they impact civil liberties. The main problem they point out is that data on the passports can be transferred with touchless RFID technology (like wireless technology) which can become a major vulnerability. Although this would allow ID-check computers to obtain your information without a physical connection, it may also allow anyone with the necessary equipment to perform the same task. If the personal information and passport numbers on the chip aren't encrypted, the information might wind up in the wrong hands.

To protect against such unauthorized reading, or "skimming", in addition to employing encryption the U.S. has also undertaken the additional step of integrating a very thin metal mesh into the passport's cover to act as a shield to make it even more difficult to read the passport's chip when the passport is closed^[5]. A U.S. company Identity Stronghold is now manufacturing an RFID blocking sleeve to prevent any skimming while the passport is inside the sleeve. Research students from Vrije University in the Netherlands speaking at the August 2006 Black Hat conference in Las Vegas showed that RFID passports can be cloned relatively easily, and can be remotely spied upon despite the radio-blocking shields included in US designs. They found they could read the passports from 60 centimetres (23.6 inches) away if they are opened by just 1 cm (0.39 inches), using a device which can be used to hijack radio signals that manufacturers have touted as unreadable by anything other than proprietary scanners. ^[6][7][8]

At the same conference, Lukas Grunwald demonstrated that it is trivial to copy the biometric certificate from an open e-passport into a standard ISO 14443 smartcard using a standard contact-less card interface and a simple file transfer tool. This is hardly surprising, given that the certificate is simply stored as a file, and had been obvious to those involved in the design of the ICAO e-passport standard throughout its development. In particular, Grunewald did not change the data held on the copied chip, which binds biometric data (e.g., photo) to identity data (e.g., name and date of birth), without invalidating its cryptographic signature, which means at present the use of this technique does not allow reprogramming of fake biometric data to match a different user. Grunewald also did not clone the Active Authentication functionality, an optional feature of the ICAO e-passport standard that some countries implement such that the embedded microprocessor is not only a floppy-disk-like data carrier for a biometric certificate, but also a tamper-resistant authentication token that can participate in a public-key cryptography based challenge-response protocol. Nevertheless, Grunewald created international media headlines with his claim that such copying of the biometric certificate constitutes the creation of a "false passport" using equipment costing around USD$200.^[9]

A group of German privacy hackers have come up with a portable device that can wipe a passive RFID-Tag permanently, called the [https://events.ccc.de/congress/2005/wiki/RFID-Zapper(EN) RFID-Zapper.]

On December 15 2006, the BBC published an article on the British ePassport, citing the above stories and adding that:

"Nearly every country issuing this passport has a few security experts who are yelling at the top of their lungs and trying to shout out: 'This is not secure. This is not a good idea to use this technology'", citing a specialist who states "It is much too complicated. It is in places done the wrong way round - reading data first, parsing data, interpreting data, then verifying whether it is right. There are lots of technical flaws in it and there are things that have just been forgotten, so it is basically not doing what it is supposed to do. It is supposed to get a higher security level. It is not."

and adding that the Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) network's research team (a body of IT security experts funded by the European Union) has "also come out against the ePassport scheme... [stating that] European governments have forced a document on its citizens that dramatically decreases security and increases the risk of identity theft."

The encryption scheme used to protect the flow of information between the Dutch biometric passport and a passport reader was cracked on July 28 2005. Though it hasn't been attempted in practice yet, in theory and under ideal conditions some of the data exchanged wirelessly between the passport's built-in contactless chip and a reader (more precisely, the one-way flow of data from the reader to the passport) may be picked up from up to 10 meters away. Once captured and stored, the data then can then be cracked in 2 hours on a PC [13]. This is due to the Dutch passport numbering scheme which does not provide sufficient randomness to generate a strong enough key to secure the exchange of information between the passport and reader.

Other passports such as the U.S. passport do not contain this particular flaw as they use a stronger key to encrypt the data exchange. Also, some readers provide shielding for the passport while it is being read, thus preventing signal leakage that might be intercepted by another device. Moreover, the fairly secure and monitored environment of the passport control area in airports would make it difficult for someone to illicitly set up the sensitive equipment necessary to eavesdrop on the communication between passports and readers from any significant distance. However the same would not be true for hotels or other places that may ask to see passports.

Some passports, such as the Irish Passport, employ an additional encryption system which prevents the RFID chip being read without the passport being "unlocked" by the machine readable zone being read first.

Gallery

Covers of various biometric passports.

Australian	British	Czech Republic	Danish
Dutch	French	Finnish	German
Hong Kong (HKSAR)	Hungarian	Italian	Irish
Japanese	Liechtensteiner	Lithuanian	New Zealand
Norwegian	Polish	Portuguese	Singaporean
United States of America	Venezuelan

See also

• Machine-readable passport
• Electronic Travel Authority
• Smartgate
• Visa Waiver Program
• Registered Traveler
• No Fly List
• Selectee list
• Secure Flight
• TSDB (Terrorist Screening Database)
• CAPPS II (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II)
• CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System)
• US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology)
• NSEERS (National Security Entry-Exit Registration System)
• PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System)
• IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System)
• SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System)
• IBIS (Interagency Border Inspection System)
• APIS (Advance Passenger Information System)
• ATS (Automated Targeting System)
• IAP (Immigration Advisory Program)
• SIS (Schengen Information System)
• Travel technology

References

• ICAO Standard for ePassports

External links

• wzPASS — Open Source e-Passport reader software and wzMRTD — Open Source library for accessing e-Passports
• Biometric-based passport in the works
• International Civil Aviation Organization
• Personal information stored in the passport's chip is vulnerable to hacking
• United States Department of State website
• US Government Printing Office
• US Names the day for biometric passports
• The new German biometric Passport
• Identity and Passport Service (UK)
• [https://www.passports.gov.au/web/epassport.aspx Information on the Australian ePassport]
• Biometry in Passports, Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
• IRIS Corporation Berhad, e-Passport Pioneer & End-to-end Solutions Provider
• RFIDIOt.org — Open Source RFID python library with e-passport test tools
• Open Source Java Card implementation of the e-passport and Java API for accessing e-passports
• Biometric Insight — Biometric Newsletter and Information Source
• Decision-making under Pressure: The Negotiation of the Biometric Passports Regulation in the Council University of Oslo: ARENA Working Paper 11/2006
• FIDIS: Budapest Declaration on Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs)

•  • [ e] Passports
By continent	Africa Egypt Mauritius Namibia Seychelles Somalia South Africa Asia People's Republic of China Hong Kong (PRC) India Indonesia Israel Japan Kazakhstan Macau (PRC) Malaysia Pakistan Philippines Republic of China (Taiwan) Thailand Singapore Vietnam Australasia Australia New Zealand Europe Armenia Austria Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Georgia Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Liechtenstein Lithuania Malta Montenegro Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom North America Belize Canada Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Panama Saint Vincent and the Grenadines United States South America Andean Community of Nations Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Peru Uruguay Venezuela
By type	Biometric passport Internal passport Machine-readable passport
Other passports	Alien's passport Camouflage passport Hajj passport