Information about Third Battle Of Panipat

Third Battle of Panipat
Part of Maratha Empire, Durrani Empire
Date 14 January, 1761 Location Panipat, modern day Haryana State,India Casus belli Maratha occupation of the Punjab Appeal by Muslim intellectuals and Rohilla leaders for assistance. Result Decisive Afghan Victory Territorial changes Northern India
Combatants
Maratha Empire	Durrani Empire
Commanders
Sadashivrao Bhau, Ibrahim Khan Gardi	Ahmed Shah Durrani, Najib-ud-Daula, Shuja-ud-Daula
Strength
40,000 cavalry, 200 pieces of artillery, 15,000 infantry, 15,000 Pindaris accompanied by 200,000 non-combatants (pilgrims and camp-followers each maratha soldier had to support 4 to 5 civilian eg women,children aged relatives who had come to visit pilgrimage site( As per Pandit Kashiraj -Diplomat & Accountant with Shuja Ud Daula Nawab of Oudh & Gulam Hussain-Mughal officer deputed by Imad Ul Mulk alias Gazi Ud Din from Maratha camp	41,800 cavalry, 120-130 pieces of cannon, 38,000 infantry in addition to 10,000 reserves, 4,000 personal guards and 5,000 Qizilbashas well as large numbers of irregulars.
An account of the last battle of Panipat and of the events leading to it by H.G Rawlinson

The Third Battle of Panipat took place on January 14, 1761 at Panipat (Haryana State, India), situated at about 80 miles (130 km) north of Delhi. The battle pitted the French-supplied^[1] and trained artillery of the Marathas against the light cavalry of the Afghans led by Ahmad Shah Abdali, a Durrani Pashtun, better known as 'Durrani'.

The decline of the Mughal Empire had led to territorial gains for the Maratha Confederacy. Ahmad Shah Abdali, amongst others, was unwilling to allow the Marathas spread to go unchecked. In 1759, he raised an army from the Pashtun tribes with help from the Baloch people and made several gains against the smaller garrisons. The Marathas, under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau, responded by gathering an army of 100,000 people with which he ransacked the Mughal capital of Delhi. There followed a series of skirmishes along the banks of the river Yamuna at Karnal and Kunjpura which eventually turned into a two-month long siege led by Abdali against the Marathas.

The specific site of the battle itself is disputed by historians but most consider it to have occurred somewhere near modern day Kaalaa Aamb and Sanauli Road. The battle lasted for several days and involved over 125,000 men. After protracted skirmishes and losses and gains on both sides the force led by Ahmad Shah Durrani came out victorious after destroying several Maratha flanks. Losses on both sides are heavily disputed by historians, it is believed that between 40,000–60,000 were killed in fighting while figures about injuries and prisoners taken vary considerably. The victorious Army led by Durrani oversaw the cremation of the bodies of Vishwas Rao and the Bhau. Many Maratha generals were subsequently tortured and executed by the victorious army. The overriding legacy of the battle was the halting of the advance of the Marathas and the brief restoration of the Mughal Empire.

Background

Main article: Mughal Empire

The Mughal Empire had been in decline since the death of the last Great Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb in 1707. The decline was accelerated by the invasion of India by Nadir Shah in 1739. Continued rebellions by the Marathas in the south, and the de-facto separation of a number of states (including Hyderabad and Bengal), weakened the state further. Within a few years of Aurangzeb's death, the Marathas had reversed all his territorial gains in the deccan, and had conquered almost all mughal territory in central and north India. In 1761, they wanted to expand further north and north west, where their path crossed Ahmad Shah Abdali - the ruler of Afghanistan, who had been making raids into Punjab for several years.

Main article: Maratha Empire

"…We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on this side of Attock under our rule for the most part, and places which have not come under our rule we shall soon bring under us. Ahmad Khan Abdali's son Taimur Sultan and Jahan Khan have been pursued by our troops, and their troops completely looted. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops...we have decided to extend our rule up to Kandahar. Raghoba's letter to the Peshwa 4th of May 1758

^[2]

The Marathas had gained control of a considerable part of India in the intervening period (1707–1757). In 1758, they occupied Delhi, captured Lahore and drove out Timur Shah Durrani,^[2] the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of the Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended in the north to the Indus and the Himalayas, and in the south nearly to the extremity of the peninsula. This territory was ruled through the Peshwa, who talked of placing his son Bishvas Rao on the Mughal throne.^[3] However Delhi still remained under the nominal control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergy in India and Punjab were alarmed at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat.^[4]

Prelude

Main article: Durrani Empire

Ahmad Shah Abdali (referred to in books as "The Abdali") angered by the news from his son and his allies was unwilling to allow the Marathas spread go unchecked. In 1759 he raised an army from the Pashtun tribes with help from the Baloch and his Rohilla ally Najib Khan. By the end of the year they had reached Lahore as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons. Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to Anupshahr, on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the Nawab of Oudh Shuja-ud-Daula to join his alliance against the Marathas.

"The lofty and spacious tents, were lined with silks and broadcloths,
were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a distance.....
Vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses,
magnificently caparisoned .... seemed to be collected from every
quarter .... it was an imitation of the more becoming and
tasteful array of the Mughuls in the zenith of their glory."
describing the Maratha Army; by Grant-Duff^[5]

The Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau (referred to as the Bhau or Bhao in sources) responded to the news of the Afghans return to North India by raising an even bigger army and marched North. The Bhau's force was bolstered by some Mahratta forces under Holkar, Scindia, the Gaikwar, Gobind Pant, contingents of the Rajputs and Suraj Mal of the Jats. This combined Army of over 100,000 regular troops captured the Mughal capital Delhi from a small Afghan garrison in December 1759, the Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city and is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwas son Viswas Rao on the Mughal throne. The Sikhs and Jats (with the exception of Ala Singh, the first Maharaja of Patiala) did not support the Marathas because of their refusal to sack Delhi, which was at that time a Maratha protectorate, and their only source of supplies in the north. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in it's result.

Initial Skirmishes

“The Shah is said to have recited some verses of the Holy Quran,
and, having blown them on an arrow, discharged from his quiver into the river.
Raising then the cry “Bismillah-i-Allah-o-Akbar” meaning,
‘in the name of God the great God’ he plunged into the river,
followed by his bodyguards and the troops.”
One report of Ahmad Shah's crossing of the Jamuna river the crossing ^[6]

With both sides poised for battle there followed much manoeuvring, with skirmishes between the two Armies fought at Karnal and Kunjpura. In Kunjpura on the banks of the Yamuna River, sixty miles to the north of Delhi, was next stormed by the Marathas and the whole Afghan garrison was killed or enslaved^[7] Ahmad Shah encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains was powerless to aid the garrison. The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within the sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated him to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.^[8] The Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from Shahdara; marching South and between the 23rd and 25th effected a crossing at Baghpat, a small town about twenty-four miles up the river unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura.

After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces crossing the Yamuna river, they set up defensive works in the ground near Panipat, thereby blocking Ahmad's access back to Afghanistan just as his forces blocked theirs to south. However in the afternoon of the 26th, Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Sambalka, about half-way between Sonpat and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Mahrattas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost a thousand men, killed and wounded, but drove back the Mahrattas to their main body, which kept on retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, Gobind Pant Bundela, with 10,000 light cavalry on a foraging mission, was surprised and slain by an Afghan force near Meerut. This in turn was followed by the loss of another 2,000 Maratha soldiers, who were delivering salaries for the soldiers from Delhi. This completed the encirclement, Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha Army's supply lines.

With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions also rose in the Maratha camp as the mercenaries in the Maratha army were complaining of lack of pay. Initially the Marathas then moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range rifled French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the times. Their plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.

Siege of Panipat

During the next two months of the siege constant skirmishes and duels took place between parties and individual champions upon either side. In one of these Najib lost 3,000 of his Rohillas, and was very near killed himself. Facing a seeming stalemate the Bhau decided to seek terms, which Ahmad Shah was willing to grant depending on the agreement of his allies. However Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on both religious grounds and threw doubt into whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.

The Marathas, difficulty in securing supplies, worsened as the local population became hostile to them. As after becoming increasingly desperate for supplies, they had pillaged the surrounding areas.

While Sadashiv Bhau was still eager to make terms, a message was received insisting on going to war and promising that reinforcements were under way. Unable to continue without supplies or wait for the reinforcements any longer, the Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.

Battle

Formations

The battle zone was probably between Kaalaa Aamb and Sanauli Road of today. The Afghan lines probably were a few metres to the south of Sanauli road. Maratha lines began a little to the north of Kaalaa Aamb. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time they themselves were blocked by the latter from the south which was in the direction to Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies. The Afghans marched in an oblique line, with their left in front, preceded by their guns, small and great. The Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the household troops, were in the centre. The left wing consisted of the gardis under Ibrahim Khan; Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.

The Maratha line was be formed up some 12 km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained. Many were middle class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to the Hindu holy places and shrines, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see Aryavarta (Aryan Land). Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young inexperienced soldiers.

On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, their left being formed by Najib's Rohillas, and their right by two brigades of Persian troops. Their left centre was led by the two Viziers, Shuja-ud-daulah and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali. The right centre consisted of Rohillas, under the well-known Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs of the Indian pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with a choice body of mailed Afghan horsemen, and in this order the army moved forward, leaving the Shah at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.

Early phases

Before dawn, on January 14, 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with the last remaining grain in camp, and prepared for combat; coming from their lines with turbans dishevelled and turmeric-smeared faces. The Maratha forces emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their pre-arranged lines, some 2 km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smoothbore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the Afghan weapons and the static nature of the Maratha artillery, the Afghan cannons proved ineffectual while Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and inflicted very little damage.

The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who in his eagerness to prove his worth; advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first Afghan attacks were broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield virtually in the hands of Ibrahim Khan for the next three hours.

In the second phase, the Bhau himself led the charge against the left of center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and soldiers started to desert their positions amidst the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan Army's center. Despite the Bhau's success, the over-enthusiasm of the charge saw many of the half starved Maratha horses exhausted long before they had travelled the two kilometres to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed. Making matters worse was the suffocating odour of the rotting corpses of men and animals left on the field from the fighting of the previous months.

Final phase

In the final phase the Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib Khan (whom he had a personal enimity with). However, Najib successfully fought a defensive action keeping Scindias forces at bay. By this stage at noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own under the two; but the centre was cut in two, and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. But now, hearing that his right was reeling and his center was defeated, he felt that the moment was come for a final effort. In front of him the Hindu cries of "Har! Har! Jai Mahadeo!" were maintaining an equal and dreadful concert with those of "Allah! Allah! Din! Din!" from his own side.

Ahmad Shah sent his body guards to call up his reserves of 15,000 highly trained troops from his camp and arranged it as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and swivel mounted cannons (shaturnals) on the back of camels. The shaturnals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry and at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry were unable to withstand the rifled muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. Ahmad Shah had 2,000 such shaturnals. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast moving cavalry. He therefore sent 500 of his own body-guards with orders to arise all able-bodied men out of camp, and send them to the front at any cost. he sent 1,500 more, to encounter those who were fleeing, and slay without pity any who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhao in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizir in close order, and at full gallop. As often as they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the Shauthurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand to hand fighting began at around 14:00. By 16:00 the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.

Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, could not move forward his young soldiers as reserves from behind and felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle at the head of the troops. Some Maratha soldiers, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee. Vishwasrao, the son of Prime Minister Nanasaheb, had already fallen to a shot in the head. Sadashivrao Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. The Afghan cavalry charged the soldiers turning the retreat into a rout.

Reasons for the outcome

The main reason for the failure of Marathas was that they went to war without good allies. Though their infantry was based on European style contingent and had some of the best French made guns of the times. Their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast moving Afghan forces.^[9] They failed to acquire allies in North India. Their earlier hegemonistic behavior and their political ambitions which led them to loot and plunder, had antagonized all the other powers. They had interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajputana states (present day Rajasthan) and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made huge territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the Sikh territory had angered the Sikh chiefs whilst some of the Sikh cheifs like Ala Singh of Patiala were working with the Abdali and were subservient to him. Similarly the Jat chiefs, on whom also they had imposed heavy fines, did not trust them. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone, except for the weak support of Imad -ul-Mulk. Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each one of them had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.

By contrast the Afghans as many historians point out started the battle with many disadvantages, they were in hostile territory which is not so as he had visited Delhi number of occasions from time of Nadir Shah’s invasion of Delhi from 1737 as a commander in Iranian army & was well aware of terrain, though initially outnumbered Ahmed Shah Abdali achieved numerical superiourity in force by forming alliance using cunning political acumen of his trusted ally Najib Khan Rohilla with Shuja Ud Daula –Nawab of Awadh,Other rohilla chieftans,Vijay singh of Jodhpur & most prize catch was Kacchwa Rajput prince Madhosingh of Jaipur(Details of political maneuvering explained later) at the same time he coerced Suraj Mal Jat & prayed that Sikh Sardars & Khattak Muslim from Multan & Sind who earlier had formed alliance with Marathas to remain aloof from battle . Ahmed Shah Abdali was 1 st time in his life facing a well trained, western equipped Army, that was undefeated and led by a single leader .Ahmed Shah Abdali –Najib Khan Rohilla knew Sadashivrao Bhau was new to terrain as well as unaware to political complications prevailing between Indus & Ganges. Ahmedshah Abdali with the help of cunning acumen of Najib Khan Rohilla cultivated contacts with other rohilla chieftans & coerced them to join their side in the name of Jihad as well as Afghan linkage , offering big opputunity in Delhi court after establishing his power over mughal court. Ahmed Shah Abdali –Najib who were following Deoband path Sunni Islam used carrot & stick policy for Shuja Ud Daula a Shia by making emotional appeal in the name of coreligion as well threatening him that his forces will occupy Awadh ,they also were able to put fear in mind of Shuja Ud Daula that Awadh has been marked next in list by forces of Maratha imperialism for swallowing or occupying it immediately after panipat campaign ,it is in interest of Shuja Ud Daula that threat to be contained .With Shuja in their camp ,using good relations between Shuja Ud Daula & Suraj mal Jat , Najib coerced Surajmal Jat to break away from Marathas by promising territorial gains .After the fatefull battle of panipat Najib had to preside over empty treasury of Delhi & being hardpressed from all side could not keep up promises resulting in standoff between Najib & Surajmal Jat .Surajraj Mal Jat attacked Delhi in December 1763 & in one reckless move from Surajmal ended his life & Jat forces had to fall back to Bharatpur.,Sikh who were unhappy about previous experience with Marathas during Raghunathrao capture of Attock,Lahore fort when Marathas denied Sikhs any role in administration & due to heavy taxation levied by occupying Marathas made Sikh & Khattak Muslims from west Punjab disinterested from Panipat campaign. Reason behind Sikh & Khattak muslims who previously had cordial relationship with Marathas during the time of Adina Beg not helping Marathas & remaining aloof from conflict can not be ascertain,Sikh & Khattak Muslims of Multan-Sind were dead enemies of Ahmed Shah Abdali.Only reasoning can be that Sikh & Khattak muslims of west Punjab had close interaction with Marathas as allies & Ahmed Shah Abdali as invader , They may forseen that end result in this closely fought conflict will be that whoever comes out victorious will become weakened with losses & will be unable to administer Punjab .This end result was forseen by Sikh & Khattak muslims from west Punjab. With ammuniation procured from Maratha war mongers Matchlocks ,muskets were available abundantly in Punjab ,Sikh sardars got their forces equipped with ammuniations such as matchlocks,muskets.Sikh sardars from Gujranwala occupied Lahore ,Sardar Jassa Singh Ahluwalia occupied Sirhind ,Khattak Muslims occupied Multan while Marathas & Afghans were in thick of conflict but Ahmed Shah Abdali allowed this to happen without wavering he along with Najib set a trap for Marathas. Najib had won over Rajput princes Vijay Singh of Jodhpur by promising him to hand over Ajmer & Prince Madhosingh of Amber (Jaipur) by boosting his ego & providing fuel to his hatred about Marathas.Prince Madhosingh’s help given to Ahmed Shah Abdali –Najib was the prime deciding factor in outcome of battle.Rajput Mahasabha held Pushkar in year 1861 passed strict comments about conduct especially of Prince Madhosingh with small footnote about Prince Vijay Singh during panipat conflict between years 1754 to 1761. Ahmed Shah Abdali in letter written to Prince Madhosingh thanks & appreciates the services provided by him, letter mentions Prince Madhosingh & his men how worked with extra zeal to intercept maratha messages couriered between Panipat and Pune,Providing information about maratha troop movements ,providing information about bickering among maratha Knights, Providing information about famine like conditions in maratha camp(scarity of ration to soldiers & fodder for cattle),Providing help for intercepting treasure transfered from Pune to Panipat.Ahmed Shah Abdali acknowledge without this help he could not seen this day & would not have been living to write this letter. Rajput mahasabha also noted that though princes advised others not to help Marathas no. of common people from rajputs in individual capacity from Malwa,Mewad,Marwad,Bundhelkhand, Baghelkhand,Doab, Punjab,Dongra rajputs,Garhwalis risked their life to help Sadashivrao Bhau. As per Buldhana district goverment gazette Sadashivrao Bhau had left Pune only with 20000 combatants & 100000 non combating civilians eg wives,children & aged relatives whereas on fatefull day of 14th Januvary 1761 as noted by Kashiraj Pandit who worked as Diplomat & minister with Shuja Ud Daula and was present at battlefield on that day in Durrani camp & had no. of opputunity to visit maratha camp for talks on treaty(refer treaty terms) made a estimate that Marathas combatants who were outnumbered by Durani forces were approximately around 60000 in number. Kashiraj Pandit who performed special cremation rites at Kashi on sarv pitri amavasya (day on which puja is performed for peace of ancestors or forefathers souls) in sept 1761 as per documents available at Mallhaghat –Varanasi with Shraddha Pandits(Wise man who performes cremation puja at holy place so that Soul reaches heaven) the names of fallen souls with their gender & age can be studied.We can easily distinguish names of fallen Rajput & Jat families from marathi names.It is also pity that this name list has many unidentified names mostly in feminine gender as well as civilians of age as small as 2 years (child) to 70 years (aged parents or relatives) .Names of fallen soldiers not exceed more than 32750 in number considering active age of soldier between 15 years to 40 years.Total names of fallen people exceed 100000 in number. Rajput Mahasabha& Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat has erected special monument honouring the fallen soldiers of battle of Panipat in Mathura along banks of Yamuna in year 1861by building temple where last rites of commoners are performed to this date. Najib engineered last minute defections from remanants of Mughal army from Maratha camp to Durrani Camp during thick of battle ,this boosted moral of Durrani forces which had received severe setback in early stages of battle when more than 15000 of their men died when the several initial Afghan attacks were broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point blank range into the Afghan ranks devastated durrani forces severely .Ahmed Shah Abdali after receiving early setback dispersed his forces out of range of maratha batteries & knowing that Maratha combatants are totally outnumbered by ratio 2:1 at beginning ,he had received advanced information of maratha plan through Najib’s spies in maratha camp.As per the plan with protection provided by Artillery,Musketeers,Pikemen,Bowmen groups of civilians will move out away from battle field southward towards Dig/Agra/Gwaliar/ Jhansi & Delhi where maratha garrison along with their allies were holding this forts .Ahmed Shah Abdali knew a time would come when Sadashivrao bhau will not have enough combatants on the battle field left for defence nor will be able to transfer civilians away from battlefield without Durrani provocation.With ratio in his favour this will be the time to make a kill by allout attack.Ahmed Shah Abdali had already made arrangement to mark Sadashivrao Bhau & his nephew Vishwasrao a lad of 19 years through Najib’s spies in Maratha camp.Ahmed Shah Abdali had made a firm determination not to allow in any circumstances Sadashivrao Bhau or Vishwasrao to escape to Delhi for the consequence he knew would be severe.Ahmed Shah Abdali knew that Sadashivrao bhau is in delicate unretrivable position & if he allows them to escape he may not get another such opportunity from almighty Allah to strike a deadly blow to enemy . Battle had started around between 4am to 5am in early hours of morning before sunrise around 2.30 pm in afternoon he had already received information that maratha combatants strength has fallen to 50 % as many units have escaped from siege toward Delhi & Deeg,He had already made arrangement to crosscheck with the intensity of fighting which had reduced drastically. As compared to its initial strength.Ahmed Shah Abdali had not allowed Vishwasrao or Sadashivrao to move by pinning their forces by series of cavalry attack followed use of shaturnals, camels with mobile artillery pieces which were at his disposal. Around 3 pm he allowed Vishwas rao to move away from battlefield this was the time Najib engineered revolt took place by deserting remanants of Mughal forces who refused to participate in attack allowing Vishwas rao to escape nor would they allow him to move away from battlefield ,in the commotion with tempers rising Vishwasrao who was mounting on horse a stray bullet fired may be by someone hit Vishwasrao & he fell from horse. It cannot be confirmed that bullet was fired by Najib’s man in maratha camp or was stray accidently fired bullet from musket of some bodyguard protecting Vishwasrao or some maratha enemy of peshwa who had become antognised by imperialistic policies executed by Peshwa eg sacking of Maratha navy stronghold Vijaydurg-Suvarnadurg(Gheria)-Alibaug with help English East India Co. Comanded by Admiral Watson & Lt Robert Clive , or attack on Bhonsales army by Peshwa’s army in Bengal or side lining Maratha King (Chatrapati) by taking all power by Peshwa,also Whether bullet hit Vishwasrao directly or his horse is not known but news of Vishwasrao falling from horse spread like wild fire in maratha camp.Maratha Knights who were actively fighting & defending their positions successfully started visiting Vishwasrao’s tent leaving their positions.Soldiers fighting in units of these knight seeing their knights unavailable to lead them started retreating back with whole units retreating back big loopholes started getting created .When Sadashivrao bhau visited Vishwasrao in his camp the effect was catastrophic .Sadashivrao Bhau absence from battlefield & unavailable for long time at the same time Vishwasrao not seen after 3 pm ,many thought Sadashivraobhau& Vishwasrao have left for Delhi. Many knights left their positions ,Maratha defence was seen broken at number of places ,Ahmed Shah Abdali a military genious could detect breach in maratha defences ,he attacked with vengeance exactly on this soft target by his cavalry supported by camel mounted guns.By the timeSadashivrao Bhau & Knights came to know their absence from field is creating dangerous situation & were back to their position damaged had already done.The maratha defences had already been breached at many places ,Ahmed Shah Abdali knew he has to make all out attack on this broken defence to win the battle,with number of available reserve troops in his favour he selected Qizilbash his special force for this duty. Durrani forces attacking with full vengeance ,rebellion at back ,Marathas had to fight two side battle .With rebellion getting out of control ,death news of Visheasrao due to nonavailability of medical care & loss of blood Sadashivrao losing patience with depleted forces decided to repell the attack wher breaching had taken place .He mounted a arab horse & led a allout attack on durrani forces.Between 4 pm to 5 pm maratha soldiers,Naiks ie captain & Knights started retreating ,unable to bear repeated attack from Durrani forces .The maratha defence started crumbling before sunset sometime after 5 pm maratha defence caved in. Durrani forces overran parts of maratha defence Still some units of 14 Km defence line kept on fighting & choose darkness as cover to escape .Some officers of maratha army took refuge with Bhangi Sikh sardars,Jassa singh Ahluwalia,Ala Singh of Patiala & Surajmal Jat.Civilian left unprotected were massacared sameday & many following days,Afghans killed those men who were above 15 years . Children –Women were taken in captivity.Many of this women & children were saved by Sikh band of stormtroopers in mid night raids on Durrani camp.In sudden raids during pitch darkness of midnight camp Sikh armed bands would attack durrani camp set fire to tents & in commotion set free women & children by taking them to safety,from this incidences 12 o clock midnight joke on Sardarji has come. Many of this saved women married their saviors one such women was grand mother of Sardar Hari Singh who was saved by Sardar Hardas Singh of Majitha .Hari Singh became orphan at early age of 7 years having lost his father in 1798 ,his grandfather was killed when Ahmed Shah Abdali attacked Amritsar Golden temple.Hari singh was brought up by his grandmother with the help of maternal relatives of Sardar Hari Singh later on distinguished himself in service of legendary Sikh King Ranjitsingh of Lahore.According to "Tarikh-i-Ahmadi" written in Persian body of Vishwasrao was cremated with full honours by Ahmed Shah Abdali who specially wanted to see his body.Ahmed Shah Abdali though himself wounded by a stray bullet which later became septic arranged special prayers for Vishwasrao along with his two brother-in-law,nephews & cousin brothers who also had fallen on battlefield. Sadashivrao Bhau body was not accounted at battlefield ,According to Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat a 1000 year old panchayat system in Punjab Sadashivrao injured & unconscious body was taken to Kurukshetra 80 Km from panipat & cremated after his soul passed away 5 days after it was brought there. Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat has erected a temple complex where on 14 th Januvary of every year a religious congregation is organized & all day long religious discothèque telling about sacrifice Sadashivraobhau performed against heavy odds ,how he had to lay down his life for values which were dearer to him & never allowed honour of his post to get tarnished is carried out from Dawn to Dusk . Special lunch known as bhog which is offered to his Samadhi cames from Commander in Chief of Ambala cantonment which is 50 Km away. Muslim historians like Warris Shah of Lahore writer of epic Punjabi novel Heer –Ranjha who had visited this shrine sometime in 1768 have acknowleged that folklore songs in Punjabi giving his example to fight against heavy odds has changed & the outlook of Jats,Sikhs ,Khattak Muslims Rajputs& Punjabis living in Punjab has being doctrined to have fighting spirit in their mind.

Terms of Treaty offered by Marathas [written in Persian(Farsi) & available with Kabul government till 1964 ]

After capturing Delhi from Afghan vazir Marathas became aware of empty treasury of Delhi administration ,As per instructions from Pune darbar & specifically from Peshwa who was worried of mounting expenses Marathas send feelers to Durrani Emperor Ahmed Shah Abdali for talks through Durrani vazir Wali Khan whose nephew was holding Delhi fort before Marathas captured it. Durrani vazir was in favour of talks & treaty with Marathas.As per final treaty document presented by marathas to Durrani vazir bearing seals of Mughal Bakshi & Peshwa representative at Mughal court which had been preserved cautiously by successive Afghan government of Kabul was the 1 st & only diplomatic document made for demarcation in Indus-Ganges region from period when Aleczender attacked King Porus or still earlier Harrappa & Mohenjedaro.Ahmed Shah Abdal was aware of talks between Durrani vazir & Marathas .Najib total opposition to this treaty was the sole reason for non acceptance of the treaty by Ahmed Shah Abdali. Though Ahmed Shah refused to ratify the treaty successive Afghan government insisted the same treaty document to reject Durrand line which was forced by English on Afghanistan. The bone of contention about the boundry between Afghanistan & Pakistan still exist about Durrand line where boundry between Afghanistan & Pakistan has been shifted several hundred Km westword than what its was in treaty document presented by Marathas in year 1759.Noted English Governor Generals ruling India ,Indian,Pakistani & Afghan political leaders were aware of this document which was last examined by UN representatives in year 1964.Present whereabouts of this important document (frompoint of view of Afghans) can not be verified with Afghanistan going under turmoil & Kabul museum getting destroyed in civil war.Kashiraj Pandit a diplomat in service of Shuja Ud Daula mentions in details about talks between Durranis & Maratha to remove political deadlock before panipat battle.Kashiraj Pandit had unique oppurtunity being present in Durrani camp & visited Maratha camp on number of occasions .Referring his version of account about original treaty presented in 1759 & as well document available at Bhandarkar Institute of Oriental Studies treaty terms were Indus river will form boundry between Durrani Empire & Maratha confederation ,No change in Mughal goverment ,Gazi Ud Din allies Imad ul Mulk will remain bakshi to Mughal emperor Marathas will be given rights to collect tax from Punjab&Sind.Durranis found this terms unacceptable.No ratification could be done.Marathas expecting local support from Jats,Sikhs,Rajputs & Khattak muslims of Punjab-Sind attacked Kunjpura a stronghold of Durrani Forces & occupied it .Ahmed Shah Abdali still camping in Rohillkhand knew it is futile to launch attack on well trained seasoned enemy forces immediately ,he was with Najib gathering allies & increasing numerical strength of Durrani forces.Sadashivraobhau & his knight who had brought families with them spend time visiting holy places took no action against durrani forces after capturing of Kunjpura.1&1/2 years passed by now logistic conditions had changed a lot.Maratha found they do not have any allies in Punjab.No help is coming from Sikh Sardars of Gujranwala or Amritsar,Khattak Muslims of Multan or Attock ,Rajput princes were giving only empty promises,Suraj Mal Jat had departed to Bharatpur. Maratha families who had finished their holy pilgrimage were eager to go back to Pune. Famine like conditions had started to appear in maratha camp.Scarity of ration to soldiers, scarity of fodder to animals,lack of hygine caused epidemic of typhoid & Cholera. Ahmed Shah meantime had used this time to improve his situation to achieve a combatant ratio of 2:1 in favour of Durrani forces he blocked path of Marathas to deccan.With Civilians(Women-Children-Aged people) to soldiers ratio of 5:1 ,Marathas had to source food,shelter,clothing & water for 3.6 lakhs of people instead of 60,000 combatants. Many historians like well known English historian H. G. Keene ,Sarkar,Sen have considered maratha forces strength as 3.6 lakhs which had noncombatatants like women-children-aged people group together with combatanting soldiers but according to Kashiraj Pandit-Diplomat of Shuja Ud Daula who was present in durrani camp aswell as maratha camp as negotiator & Gulam Hussain mughal official deputed by Gazi Ud Din –Mughal Bakshi who was in maratha camp on that fatefull day maratha combatant strength was less than 60000. According to "Tarikh-i-Ahmadi" written in Persian Ahmed Shah acknowledges this figure of <60000. Punjab in those time due to repeative invasions & continuous wars had turn into desert very much different than what it is in present times.Marathas were facing durrani forces of numerical strength 1,20000 combatants & behind whom there was nothing but scorched desert.Sadashivraobhau around 2 months prior to day of battle facing difficulties had scaled down his terms & offered 25 % of annual revenue from Punjab-Sind amounting to Rs 1Crore ,Appointment of Shah Alam as Mughal Emperor rest of terms remaining unchanged.Ahmed Shah Abdali sensing Marathas in delicate position & trapped with their families rejected it ,he demanded total withdrawal of Marathas beyond Chambal in Bundhelkhand,appointment of Taimur Shah as governor of Lahore ,Appointment of new bakshi the name which he did not disclose as both Najib & Shuja were interested in the post.He also left the choice of Mughal emperor unclear,Tarikh-i-Ahmadi informs his interest to establish afghan power in Indus-Ganges plains same as Sultan Muhammad Ghori.This terms were unacceptable to Marathas so the deadlock continued.Meantime situation worsened in maratha camp whreas durrani camp with their supply line intact were getting provisions & reinforcement unhindered from Rohillkhand which was approximately 100 to 150 Km away.Ahmed Shah Abdali knew time was on his side.1 week prior to day of battle Sadashivraobhau acknowledging precarious situation maratha camp was facing & no help coming from deccan offered 50% of annual revenue from Punjab-Sind amounting to Rs.2 Crores,Bakshi power to be divided into Gazi Ud Din,Shuja Ud Daula & Najib Khan Rohilla,Establishment of Joint Afghan-Mughal command in Attock,Multan,Lahore, Kasur but refused to surrender Kunjpura to Afghans.Durrani vazir,Abdali’s sonTaimur Shah ,Abdali’s brother in law Jahan Khan Baluch ,Shah Pasand –Chief of Staff both were killed later in battle,Shuja Ud Daula Awadh nawab were in favour of treaty.At some point as per Tarikh-i-Ahmadi, Siar-ul-Mutakharin and the Tarikh-i-Mozafari Ahmed Shah Abdali unsure of decisive victory decided to ratify treaty but Najib refused to toe this line convincing that according to his spies Marathas are facing famine like situation in panipat,no help can reach from deccan before end of march 1761,maratha garrison at Delhi,Agra,Gwaliar,Jhansi,Deeg cannot reach panipat without breaking durrani siege & Deobandi scholar Shah Walliullha who was advocating Jehad could convince Ahmed shah that if he wins Allah will reward him with Delhi & if he dies he will be rewarded heaven.Ahmed Shah Abdali a wise king knew when to take proper decision.Ahmed Shah Abdali decided to review the treaty after fortnight.Early hours of 14th Januvary 1761 Marathas started loading their artilleries,putting bayonets on muskets,poisoning their bows,pikes,spears& swords.Around 3 am in early hours 1st round of artillery shell firing began. At the same time 1st batch of civilians moved southwards under cover provided by Maratha musketeers ,Pikemen,bowmen cavalrymen of 10000 men led by Samsher Bahadur eldest muslim son of Legendary Peshwa Bajirao via Rohtak.Civilians mostly included families of 2nd & 3rd rung officials of maratha forces.Beyond Rohtak Surajmal Jat forces gave them protection uptill Deeg accompanied by around 3000 combatants from Sadashivrao bhau maratha forces headed by 1 maratha knight.Samsherbahadur & 7000 men came back to ferry another group of civilians.10 such sorties could be achield till near collapse & rout of maratha forces at panipat.Knights who ferried civilians to safety of Deeg,Jhansi & Gwaliar wereMalharrao Holkar,Gaikwar, Mahadji Shinde, Nana Phadanavis,Binwale,Vinchurkar, Govind Pant Bundela who was killed while protecting this civilians after durrani forces blocked movement of civilians later in the day.Samsher Bahadur was also injured in a different sorty while protecting ferrying civilians to safety & later on died in grief at Kumbheri a mosque was built by his wife& son in memory of samsher Bahadur.Jat King Surajmal helped retreating Marathas by giving provision & shelter.Some Maratha knights & soldiers with their families took refuge with Bhangi Sikh sardars ,Jassa Singh Ahluwalia & Ala Singh of Patiala.Out of 3.6 lakhs present at panipat only around 1 lakh civilians-soldiers included have been accounted as dead at Varanasi Mallha ghat 50000 were taken captive by durrani forces still 2.1 lakhs figure seems to be bit large for rescue efforts.Sadashivrao knowing the fate of battle with numerical strength favouring durrani forces & knowing help will be required for rescueing such a large no. of people stagemanaged difference with Surajmal Jat enabling him to break away.Surajmal Jat & specifically Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat went out of the way to help retreating Marathas.Many enghlish historians like H. G. Keene ,Sarkar,Sen claim those maratha knights who escaped battlefield ran away from their duties which is not the case as recent document reveal that they were escorting the civilians to safety,Otherwise Samsherbahadur who escorted wife of Sadashivrao bhau Parvatibai & no. of families of maratha soldiers doing no. of sorties from Panipat via Rohtak to Kumbheri& Deeg should be put in same basket by learned historians H. G. Keene ,Sarkar,Sen as those bracketed as deserters.This historians with biased views had written monologue sitting in armchair as it was not logistically possible for them to visit actual topography.Study conducted by officers of English Indian army in 1805 seems to describe the events with maximum accuracy of 30%.This reports later fed to historians was used to break moral of Indians. Many enghlish historians like H. G. Keene ,Sarkar,Sen claim that remnants of maratha army was looted by locals which seems contradictary to documents available with Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat at Kurukshetra, Akhand Sikh panth at Dera Baba Nanak,Rajput Mahasabha-Mathura.Again it may be case of these learned historians had wasted interest to promote English(now British) point of view.Institute of Behavioral Sciences,department of Psycoanalysis,Pune advices readers don’t take information from such sources as simple truth but apply logic to verify its authenticity.By not ratifying treaty in Januvary 1761 Afghans lost a chance to have peace with destiny , stable past ,progressive future & the history of Afghanistan became full of turmoil,bloodshed, mistrust.It seems they may have missed the bus & have to wait for another 250 years for another set of Ahmed Shah Abdali & Sadashivraobhau to born.

Aftermath

"Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow, and as willed by the divine Lord, the wretched Deccanis suffered utter defeat.." excerpt from Ahmad Shah's letter to Madho Singh Raja of Jaipur [10]

The body of Vishwas Rao and the Bhau were recovered by the Afghans and under Ahmad Shah's personal direction were cremated according to Hindu custom. The Bhau's wife Parvatibai was saved by Holkar as per the directions of Bhau and eventually they returned to Pune. About 40,000 Maratha civilians and soldiers were slain while many of the fleeing Maratha women jumped into the Panipat wells rather than risk rape and dishonour. Many others did their best to hide in the streets of Panipat where the locals of the town refused to give them refuge on account of the fear of now victorious afghans. Many others including the Jankoji Scindia took refuge under Shuja ud Daulah's forces.

The Peshwa Balaji Rao, uninformed about the state of his army, was crossing the Narmada with reinforcements when a tired Charkara arrived with a cryptic message "Two pearls have been dissolved, 27 gold coins have been lost and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up". The Peshwa never recovered from the shock of the total debacle at Panipat. He returned to Pune and died a broken man in a temple on Paravati Hill. Other Maratha generals were not so lucky, Jankoji Scindia was taken prisoner and executed at the instigation of Najib Khan. Similarly Ibrahim Khan Gardi was tortured and executed at the hands of enraged Afghan soldiers. The Marathas did not fully recover from the loss at Panipat, although they did remain the predominant military power in India and managed to retake Delhi barely two decades later. However their claim over all of India ended with the three Anglo Maratha wars, almost 50 years after Panipat.

The Jats under Suraj Mal benefited significantly from not participating in the battle of Panipat. They also provided considerable assistance to the Maratha soldiers and civilians who escaped the fighting. Suraj Mal himself was killed in battle against Najib Khan.^[11] Ahmed Shah's victory left him, in the short term, the undisputed master of North India. However, his alliance quickly unravelled amidst squabbles between his generals and other princes, as well as the increasing restlessness of his soldiers over pay and the increasing Indian heat. Before departing, he ordered the Indian chiefs, through a Royal Firman (order) (including Clive of India), to recognize Shah 'Alam II as Emperor. He left Delhi two months after the battle, refusing the throns of Delhi and returning to his lofty mountains of Afghanistan, the eternal abode of the brave Afghan people.

Ahmed Shah also appointed Najib-ud-daulah as ostensible regent to the Mughal Emperor. In addition, Najib-ud-daulah and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay to the Abdali, on behalf of the Mughal King, an annual tribute of forty lacs.^[11] This was to be Ahmed Shah's final major expedition to North India, as he became increasingly pre-occupied with the increasingly successful rebellions by the Sikhs.^[12]

The victory at Panipat was the highest point of Ahmad Shah's-and Afghan-power. Afterward, even before his death, the empire began to unravel. Ahmad Shah was less fit to cope with insurrection because he suffered from severe ulceration of the face, an ailment that was probably cancer caused by hit from stray scarpnel fired from Maratha artillery or musket during thick of battlefield as noted from Siar-ul-Mutakharin and the Tarikh-i-Mozafari written in Persian(Farsi) obtained after capture of Bijnour during English East India Co & Shuja Ud Daula –Nawab of Oudh joint campaign against rohillas in Januvary 1774 now preserved along with East India Co. records in London . Even before the end of 1761 the Sikhs had risen and taken control of much of the Punjab & Lahore in particular. Ahmed Shah Abdali’s words immediately after prayer for thanking almighty Allah for victory against Marathas led by Sadashivrao Bhau ” I thank Allah for considering me worthy of such hard fought victory,& saving his noble servant from death and destruction from the hands of infiedels by skin of hair ,Ahmed Shah Abdali a humble servant thanks almighty Allah by gifting victory over defeat ” Ahmed Shah Abdali a military genious camped on battlefield for fortnight maybe for recovery of his septic in wounds caused in battle or for mourning the fallen kinsmens ,close relatives such as his 2 brother in laws,nephews & cousin brothers .He spent time reviewing the closely fought battle & studying deeply which maratha strategy went haywire causing total rout of a battle hardened seasoned enemy. Ahmed Shah Abdali thanked Najib Khan Rohilla for showing political acumen in isolating Sadashivrao Bhau’s maratha army & preventing Marathas getting into alliance with Rajputs,Jats,Sikhs,Mughals , Khatri or Khattak Muslims from west Punjab depriving maratha army rations ,fodder for cattle & causing desertion from remants of mughal army to achieve numerical superiority.This desertion of mughal forces engineered by Najib Khan Rohilla during thick of battle by revolting & changing sides when maratha forces where actively engaged in fighting was moral booster for Afghan forces which had weakened after suffering heavy casualties from maratha artillery,pikmen & musketeers during opening stages of battle. Later on 6 years afterwords in April 1767 during campaign against Sikhs when Ahmed Shah Abdali visited panipat again & met Najib Khan Rohilla he lamented about Afghan-Baluch losses in 1761 battle & complained about not getting enough help from establishment at Delhi to suppress Sikh rebellion in Punjab.Najib Khan Rohilla already hard pressed from adversaries around Delhi & facing threat from Marathas stationed at Dig in Rajputana ,Gwaliar-Jhansi in BundeKhand & whose writ ruled only inside boundries of Delhi was unable to galvanise any support for Ahmed Shah Abdali.Najib was also aware of changed conditions or ground realities in Punjab which are explained later after Third battle of Panipat & was not ready to risk his position at Delhi. Ahmed Shah Abdali cautioned Najib Khan Rohilla about hatred caused in minds of Pakhtun,Baluch chieftans especially his close relatives who feel they have legitimate grouse about Najib that though they were the one who sacrificed a lot & Najib was sole benefactor in the outcome of struggle. Ahmed Shah Abdali pointed out that most of his Afghan-Baluch kinsmen feel what gains Durranis could have achieved diplomatically with treaty with Marathas in 1761 have been washed out by losses sustained by Durrani forces in battle of panipat ,Najib Khan Rohilla sole opposition to treaty with marathas & Shah Walliullah’s Jehadi call forced him to go in battle which nearly took his life & losses to kinsmen. Around this time Ahmed Shah Abdali accepted that with weakened Afghani forces & with his falling health it will be impossible to suppress Sikh revolt & became mentally prepared to forgo Afghan claims on Punjab & Sind. Muslim historian acknowledge Ahmed Shah Abdalis victory over Marathas in Third battle of Panipat was biggest victory achieved by any predominantly muslim forces over enemy & stands distinctively at top of Islamic forces victory chart ,historians say this was the sole & unique victory among no. of battle fought & won from start of Islamic conquest by muslim army from year 624 AD(Battle of Badr) because this was the only & rare battle in which Ahmed Shah Abdali’s predominantly muslim army had to face well trained battle hardened seasoned military force whereas other muslim victories were victories over enemy forces of decaying empire or whose forces were not battle tested or seasoned fighting forces eg Arab victory over decaying Persian empire ,Turk victory over decayed Bryzantine empire or Turk victory over Serbia at Battle of Kosovo ,Historians pointout exception to Saladin’s victory over crusaders for battle of Jerusalem was achieved by sheer numerical strength of forces available with Saladin as compared to opposing forces. Muslim historians also point out political insignificance from the outcome of this fierce struggle between two campaigning forces spanning over period of 7 years from 1754 to 1761 with struggle peaking & becoming savage at the end between 1759 to 1761,With Afghans depleting their strength after battle of Panipat were unable to keep their control over Lahore & parts of Punjab . Sikh Bhangi sardars of Gujranwala who with his sikh army & little guidance from escaped officers of maratha army eg maratha musketeers - artillery men who could escape Afghan massacre aftermoth of battle by taking shelter with Bhangi Sikh Sardars wrested control of Lahore & raided Multan in June 1761 barely within 3 month after departure of Ahmed Shah Abdali’s forces.This officers & men layed mines to breach ramparts or massive fortifications of Lahore & Multan fort as was previously done at Kunjpura by Sadashivrao bhau forces before battle of panipat.With breaching of Lahore fort walls & advent of mine laying activity no fort anywhere in Punjab remained impregnable from attack of Bhangi Sardars. During muslim rule of Punjab with strong Mughal or Afghan forces stationed at Lahore,Multan,Kunjpura & Attock forts could control Punjab from safety of strong fortifications carring out punitive raids on sikhs.With mine laying activity brought by Marathas during panipat campaign all the advantages enjoyed earlier by Afghan-Mughal forces evaporated & same Afghan forces became mercy of raiding sikh forces.Ahmed Shah Abdali accepting this fact advised his son Timur Shah to mend forces with Sikhs. ( all this docuiments are available in Siar-ul-Mutakharin and the Tarikh-i-Mozafari written in Persian at London)

After the battle of Panipat the services of the Rohillas were rewarded by the grants of Shikohabad to Nawab Faiz-ullah Khan and of Jalesar and Firozabad to Nawab Sadullah Khan. Najib Khan proved to be an effective ruler in that time; however, after his death in 1770, the Rohillas again faced the Marathas, this time without Afghan support. This eventually culminated in the East India Company's Rohilla Campaign.^[13]

Excerpts from study report of third battle of panipat headed by Arthur Wellselley for English east India co.

Team of Officers of English east India Co. under Arthur Wellselley conducted a study between 1803 to 1805 about third battle of panipat which had taken place around 43 years earlier(copy of which is available in London )The survey was conducted by actually interviewing surviving participants of this battle as well as checking records written by Kashiraj Pandit at Varanasi,Gulam Hussain’s version,Rohilla document found after capture of Bijnor in 1774,records kept by Pandits at Ujjain,Mathura,Haridwar ,Kurukshetra, documents available at Amber of Prince Madhosingh ,Documents at Pune were verified later after English East India Co. defeated Peshwa in 1818 the report mentions the victory for durrani forces was gift of almighty Allah to Ahmed Shah Abdali,durrani forces though had achieved numerical superiority around Januvary 1761 but were still facing a trained ,equipped & seasoned forces.The Najib engineered rebellion of deserting mughal soldiers around 3pm,Falling of Vishwasrao from horse around same time,absence of Sadashivraobhau-Vishwasrao & Knights leading the units for long time around 4pm ,absence of proper medical treatment after the fall to Vishwasrao resulting in excessive blood loss & death in the hands of his uncle Sadashivraobhau,Thereafter Sadashivraobhau loosing composer ? & acting in desperation (comment reqd) ,early unrequired attack by maratha cavalry ,fatigue after >16 hrs of battle preparation & >14 hrs of actual fighting ,lack of availability of artillery shells-muskets around 5 pm after stocks getting exhausted ,want of 1 more infantry brigade of musketeers were the prime reasons for marathas loosing day of 14 Januvary 1761 .Politically & diplomatically they had lost the battle quite earlier.Marathas unable to forge alliance with Sikhs,Khatri-Khokhar-Shaikh Muslims of West Punjab-Sind,Unable to carry Jats & Nawab of Awadh along with them(Marathas),unable to identify role of Najib Khan Rohilla,Prince Madhosingh of Amber & Prince Vijay Singh of Jodhpur in panipat campaign at the earliest were main reason for debacle.Englishmen commented Marathas wasted 1& ½ year after storming & capturing Kunjpura spending time on visiting holy pilgrimage places instead of using this advantage for political & military gains caused lax in military-political activity, allowed durrani forces to escape vice like grip of Marathas & Ahmed Shah Abdali-Najib Khan Rohilla used this time to turn the side by achieving required numerical superiority.Sadashivraobhau left Burhanpur on Banks of Tapi in Januvary-Februvary 1758 captured Delhi in mid of May1758 attacked Kunjpura & captured it in Februvary-March 1759 ,capturing of Kunjpura was a great feat from military point of view as Kunjpura was defended by very strong Afghan garrison with strength of around 5000 soldiers,Kunjpura Fort had massive fortifications with tall ramparts ,protected by cannons . Kunjpura strategically located on Grand Trunk road from Delhi to Lahore & further Kabul could control any traffic passing from Delhi to Punjab ,Ahmed Shah Abdali had left it well protected. Blitzkrieg attack on Kunjpura by Marathas ,laying of mines around walls of forts, demolishing of massive fort wall by exploding mines,attack by cavalry ,sudden retreat by the cavalry followed quickly by artillery shelling & sudden charging of musketeers to overcome any opposition this war game was new to Ahmed Shah Abdali,He had never imagined such activities.From Anupshahr he saw massive fortified walls pulverized & Afghan garrison massacred. English officers who have recorded this description commented this was something new in warfare using explosion of mine to break massive fortification & capturing well defended forts with heavy bombardment of artillery shells- muskets has changed the rules of war & Age of modern warfare had arrived.English officers describe how fear may have traveled from spinalcord of every durrani soldier.But Ahmed Shah Abdali was man of different spine,He knew futility of attack on maratha positions.He kept Marathas busy in diplomatic talks.Marathas who had become overconfident showed laxness & lost momentum.Around same time Afghans lost control of Sihind,Lahore,Kasur to sikhs & Multan-Attock to Khokhar-Khatri -Shaikh Muslims. English officers suspected same maratha mine technology may be used to demolish massive fortifications of this Afghan held forts. Was involvement of maratha officials for mine laying & providing musketeers for mopping up operation against afghan garrisons based at Sirhid,Kasur,Lahore,Multan Attock forts to enable local Sikhs,Muslim Khatri,Syed-Shaikhs or Khokhars-Khattak Muslims capture it or gain control over it was the reason no action to be taken against durrani forces by marathas after capture of Kunjpura from March 1759 to November 1760 for 1&1/2 years.? Meanwhile Maratha knights along with their families poured to visit holy pilgrimage places & situation got out of hand for Marathas.Ahmed Shah Abdali a military genious had turn tide on Marathas he got allied with other rohilla chieftans,nawab of Awadh,Prince Vijay Singh of Jodhpur & Kachawa Prince Madho singh of Amber.Ahmed Shah Abdali got a special cannon Zamzama made for battle by asking every soldier to donate voluntarily gold mohurs for making of Zamzama, in this way ensured each soldier will have stake in the campaign ,he got camel mounted guns shatunals delivered from Nawab of Awadh still they were no match for maratha artillery & agnigol units.Afghan garrisons being evicted from Delhi to start with along with Sirhind,Lahore,Kasur,Multan,Attock & tales of atrocities about massacre of Afghan garrison at Sirhind& Kunjpira had a cascading effect on Afghan soldiers psyche now it was do or die for common afghan soldier,He had full faith in his Ahmed Baba as Ahmed Shah is known Sadofzai clan.Most of the garrison at this places were held by sadofzai clan members.Afgans from all this places started joining Durrani forces as cavalry units.Ahmed Shah Abdali a military genious maintained strict quality control over recruitment , only those who could sustain rigours of long drawnout war were allowed to join,durrani forces had not allowed families of any soldier or high ranking officials to join the camp.This was a total reverse picture as compared to Maratha camps.Najib’s spies in Maratha camps as well as with flow of information from Prince Madhosingh of Amber,he was able to monitor most of the maratha camps minutely. He had allowed families of maratha knight to reach northern pilgrimage sites but would not allow this soft target to move away from cluthes.Around November 1760 he received status report of maratha camps & famine like conditions approaching in several maratha camps due to overcrowding straing limited resources available in camps. Ahmed Shah was closely monitoring northbound & southbound flow of people from Najib’s spies at Delhi & through Kachawa Prince Madhosingh’s men at Mathura,Jaipur,Ujjain.Marathas coming from south would visit holy pilgrimage places of Ujjain, Mathura for performing religious rites.Prince Madhosingh’s men acting like puja pandit (priest performing puja)at pilgrimage places & dharmashalas(resting places) would gather information about the family , age,occupation,no of family members their ages this information was passed to Ahmed Shah.Ahmed Shah by this time came to know that for every maratha combatant there is 5 to 6 noncombatting civil members of his family eg. Wife,children,sister in law, aged parents or relatives.He had instructed to document separately names of young men between age 15 to 40 as this was age group of combating soldier.Two months before the day of battlefield Ahmed Shah had complete information about 3.6 Lakhs of people are in maratha camps out of which there are only <60000 combating soldiers. Ahmed Shah Abdali by this had numerically strong 120000 durrani forces to block the maratha passage to south. As per description in English report Ahmed Shah decided this was ideal time was time to close the lid of jar. He crossed Yamuna around September October 1760 when flood waters receeded & blocked south bound traffic.Durrani forces showed no mercy in killing families trying to cross siege. Maratha camps were distributed 50 Kms north of panipat mostly concentrated around Kurukshetra which itself was holy pilgrimage place for Marathas. Parvatibai wife of Sadashivraobhau was staying at Kurukshetra on the day of battle how she could escape durrani forces is really a mystery. Whether she cremated dead body of Sadashivraobhau as reported by Sarv Khalp Jat Panchayat cannot be confirmed.After Ahmed Shah blocking southbound flow lot of confusion & chaos took place as most of civilians crossing Panipat had left Kurukshetra 1 week earlier.Maratha camps in vicinity of panipat not having facilities for such great number of occupants started facing difficulties due to overcrowding,shortage of food,water,shelter & other hygienic problems. News of durrani blockage was shattering in Maratha camps.Untill the time Marathas storming Kunjpura Maratha army outlook was attacking in Blitzkrieg fashion without giving opponents chance to plan a strategy but with no action for 1&1/2 year situation had changed ,forget about attacking & harassing durrani forces Sadashivraobhau was facing worries how to protect civilians & take them safely to Pune .With civilians in all these camps maratha army had to face host of other problems hampering military operations. Situation in Maratha camps was only to deteriorate further.News of this blockade reached maratha garrisons based at Delhi,Agra,Deeg,Jhansi,Kumheri,Gwaliar& Sagar.Efforts to break were fultile as Ahmed Shah was well prepared for it.Ahmed Shah knew such strong siege can only be broken by Artillery.Ahmed Shah had information about artillery ammuniation eg shells,musket,agnigol(type of missile or cluster bomb-described later Warning:Do not try to manufacture it as it is life threatening,dangerous& illegal to manufacture) available in Panipat camp that it would not last for more than 2 days if he can manage siege for 2 days with numerical advantage durrani forces had achieved ,he can overrun main maratha camps at the end.Ahmed Shah had prior information of maratha war mongers selling muskets, matchlocks,mines in open market in Punjab which Sikhs,Muslims in west Punjab & even some Afghans had procured it from maratha war mongers.Another artillery battalion to reach from Pune would be taking minimum 5 to 6 months to reach Panipat.Around 8th Januvary 1761 facing acute famine like conditions in maratha camps & knowing reinforcement from Pune will not reach before end of March 1761 Sadashivraobhau offered new terms of conditions 50% of annual revenue from Punjab-Sind amounting to Rs.2 Crores to Durranis,Bakshi-Naib Vazir power to be divided into Gazi Ud Din,Shuja Ud Daula & Najib Khan Rohilla,Establishment of Joint Durrani-Mughal command in Attock,Multan,Lahore, Kasur.Status of Kunjpura,Sirhind was left unmentioned.Everybody in durrani camp except Najib & Walliullha were in favour of signing the treaty Najib opposition to treaty was based on his argument that once Marathas will reach Delhi they would not honour any agreement. With Walliullha preaching Jehadi sermons it became slightly embracing for Ahmed Shah to ratify the treaty immediately & allow infiedels to escape.Disagreement broke between Najib on one side & Durrani side including Wazir,Ahmed Shah’s Son Taimur Shah,Ahmed Shah brother in law Jehan Shah,Shah Pasand & even rohilla sardar hafiz Rahmat Khan on other side.Najib after heated discussion seeing his whole plan coming cropper commented emotionally with tears in eyes“You people will take gold mohurs & leave for your lofty mountains but I will be left with these thorns pricking,these Marathas will not allow me to live peacefully nor would allow me to die’’Saying this he left the meeting asking Ahmed Shah to excuse him.Ahmed Shah & everybody was stunned.The meeting was dispersed.Ahmed Shah later on met Najib in solitude.Ahmed Shah told Najib” You are like dear friend ,I know you have toiled the most to reach to attain this position,do not get disheartened,I will not do any thing that will harm you,Believe in almighty Allah ,he is supreme ,he will give the solution” With this Ahmed Shah & Najib performed the late evening prayer.Earlier in November 1760 Sadashivraobhau had offered another set of treaty terms which Ahmed Shah was reviewing before this new set of terms came.Ahmed Shah knew Sadashivraobhau has now become desperate as clever king he anticipated danger,now he cannot delay the decision further , Ahmed Shah held a secret meeting with durrani Vazir & his son Taimur Shah on pretext of having prayer ,They discussed reports from Najib spies in maratha camps about desperate situations Marathas are facing in camps around Panipat , Information received from Prince Madhosingh about imminent threat approaching from deccan . A strong enforcement of Maratha soldiers accompanying Peshwa with strong artillery unit under French commander & with seasoned military generals like Bhonsale from Nagpur (Son of Raghuji Bhonsale who with his continuous raids brought Ali Vardi Khan –Nawab of Bengal to his knees) & Ghorpade from Sandur, Karnataka (great grandson of legendary cavalry general Santaji Ghorpade who in one of daring commando raid on Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb’s tent had taken the gold pinnacles away ) & who had kept Hyder Ali at bay by maintaing strong presence in Karnataka has crossed Tapti at Burhanpur ,This contingent was expected to reach panipat in March- April 1761. Ahmed Shah knew after februvary it will be difficult for Afghans with heavy armour on their body to bear heat of plains,Ahmed Shah exclaimed “It has been long time almost 3 years of not seeing snow capped lofty mountains,deep ravines & swift flowing rivers”.Durrani wazir replied to Ahmed Shah that Afghan-Baluch soldiers are homesick & want Ahmed Shah to find solution to this deadlock.Three discussed in details late upto night & agreed to ratify the treaty within fortnight that was 10th Januvary 1761 night.He told both his son & wazir not to speak about this to any one,he will speak out with Najib to change his view, about Walliullha he told let him rattle about Jehad , he will shutup when his tongue will start paining.As a king I can not allow Mullah to decide course of action.It seems Ahmed shah had decided to ratify treaty on any day between 15th Januvary 1761 & 25 th Januvary 1761.But almighty Allah had different plans.Sadashivraobhau after giving best possible terms to Ahmed Shah & no message coming from Kashiraj Pandit who was diplomat of Nawab of Awadh decided to break the siege by making frontal attack at the same time allow civilians continents to escape under protection via Rohtak & Jind by skirting Delhi.Many of maratha knights had taken refuge with local chieftans by paying gold mohurs as well selling matchlocks,muskets. Sadashivraobhau was facing precarious position pestered may be from families of knights for his indecision & failure to forsee this situation he ordered artillery guns to be serviced & layed in final position for firing,Matchlocks Catapult were serviced,Arrows,Spears ,Bayonets & Swords were dipped in barrel having Poison cream,pre battle drill with war music was conducted .Native music has a peculiar phenomenon along with drill known as lazim when experienced for long time one goes in trance or gets hypnotized& individual can perform task which are impossible in normal life. Bhang was distributed as per the ration to soldiers.It is really astonishing that while this preparation for assault was going out Ahmed Shah Abdali was unaware of the forecoming attack untill 1st round of artillery shell fired from advanced Artillery batteries fell on durrani camp around 3 am of 14 th Januvary 1761 .Durrani camp was taken unaware of this assault until it was carried out.Damage was done.Now Ahmed Shah had no option but to fight it out.It is surprising how Najib with such effiecient spy network could not forsee this assault or whether Najib purposely held this information back is unknown or the artillery batteries were set secretely night before assault was made.Ahmed Shah held urgent meeting with durrani vazir , Chief of staff & decided to do counterattack in later in the daylight.Continuous pounding was damaging durrani camp, eye witness confirmed with artillery firing & durrani tents set on fire Marathas could mark out movements in durrani camp but at the same time Ahmed Shah was keeping track of maratha ammuniation stock getting exhausted.More than damage he was pleased with 2nd option.After sunrise in broaddaylight afghan counter attack started & rest of the details of battle are explained earlier so need not be repeated.English East India Co. officials were exposed to missiles fired at them in carnatic wars with Hyderali & Tipu Sultan. Agnigol was something to similar to earlier version of missiles.Mixture of Jaggery,Camphor, Sulphur & Phosphorous was mixed in molasis & round balls are made from mixture which were thrown from wooden swivel mounted spring loaded catapult ,this catapult use to break after some operations but the range of such catapult was around >2 Km.This balls were ignited before being thrown, depending on mixture timing of explosion was controlled.Some time this catapult use to malfunction & to prevent agnigol to explode before launching they use to dipped in water barrel at once but still some explosion use to take place before launching causing accidents.Burning agnigol when launched & after attaining particular temperature would explode mid air creating shockwaves & inferno in air which could scare horses of advancing cavalry unit bring down the cavalrymen & causing stampede.At the same time if exposed directly to flame burns were severe.Sometimes Agnigol would be packed with poisonus seeds of particular plants available in western ghats, This seed similar to caramondum having tough outer shells & sticky substance in the shell which caused irritation to skin,eyes,throat,giddiness & acted like slowpoison if fragments penetrated body.The injury could leed to paralysis.Ulcer-Cancer of skin or gangrene. When agnigol packed with this seeds used to explode in air it acted like cluster bombs & broken seed fragments traveling at high speed use to penetrate unprotected humanbody parts.Injury list in durrani camp inlclued many top sardars including Ahmed Shah himself.Some times Agnigol were attached to arrow shot from bow & could reach around 1 Km distance.This agnigol caused psychological & anatomical damage in durrani forces & were cause of slow painful death for more no. of soldiers in durrani forces after the battle in due course of span >10 years than around >42000 durrani soldier who died on the day of battle.Later on this was improved upon along with missiles as used by Tipu’s army by English army men & was used at Waterloo with decastating results.The end result though maratha army had better weaponry is that they had not enough manpower around 5pm in the evening to sustain repeated attacks from durrani forces as 50 % of their combating force had already left battle field.Once their ammuniation got exhausted as expected by Ahmed Shah then it was left to hand to hand fighting,Maratha soldiers who after slogging for >30 hrs nonstop from morning of 13th Januvary 1761 didn’t have any strength left for running away from battle field.Fresh afghan troops having heavy physical strength were more than match for fatigued maratha soldiers who were starving for 2 months on meager ration. That is the reason Duke of Wellington later on said in English parliament said Military walks on stomach.English East India Co. officials comment that if Marathas had 1 more infantry brigade as that of Ibrahim Khan Gardi-Deputy commander in chief of maratha army whose Telangis,gardi musketeers held durrani forces at bay uptill dusk the end result would have been different.Absence of 1 infantry brigade of musketeers & insufficient stock of artillery shell - Agnigol were the reason of the rout of maratha army at panipat.After study of third battle of Panipat the team of officials has made a list of dos & don’t for military some of which can be elaborated A) In war times civilians should not be allowed to mingle & interfere in military operations B)Never go in war ill equipped C) No compromise can be made on military intelligence D)Medical wing giving life saving support is must E)Supply lines should not get endangered F)Logistic problem should be solved immediately G) Winning through diplomacy is better option H) Trained army can sustain in long drawnout battle I)Soldier should get required calories through his food J) Stress control should be achieved Footnote: Part of this report was implemented after 1st Anglo Sikh war after forces of English East India Co. faced few setbacks or reversals in battle field before that sometime officers of English East India Co. use to accompanied officially or unofficially by their wives.During capture of Awadh from Wajid Ali Shah many officers were accompanied by their wives & children,1 such officer had 17 indian wives & no. of children. Also partly implemented in the Crimean war fought between Turks-French& English forces v/s Austro Hungarian & Russian forces

Legacy

The wreath of banquet overnight lay withered on the neck, Our hands and scarfs were saffron-dyed for signal of despair, When we went forth to Paniput to battle with the ~Mlech~, Ere we came back from Paniput and left a kingdom there. With Scindia to Delhi by Rudyard Kipling

The Third Battle of Panipat saw an enormous number of casulties and deaths in a single day of battle, perhaps unmatched even today in the later wars. It was the scene of uncommon valour, unwanted strategic blunders, internal bickerings, enormous brutality on both sides and remained the last major battle between two major indigenous South Asian military powers.

The battle changed the course of Indias history. The Marathi term "Sankrant Kosalali" meaing "Sankranth has befallen us" is said to have originated from the events of the battle.^[14] Many historians, including British historians of the time, have argued that had it not been for the weakening of the Maratha power at Panipat, the British might never have had a strong foothold in India.^[15]

However the strength of Afghan military prowess was to both inspire hope in many orthodox Muslims, Mughal royalists and fear in the British. The acknowledgement of Abdalis military accomplishments are reflected by British intelligence reports on the battle of Panipat, which referred to Ahmad Shah as the 'King of Kings'.^[16] Fear of an alliance between the French and Afghans led in 1798 to a British envoy, to the Persian court, being instructed to stir up the Persians against the Afghan Empire.^[17]

After Ahmad Shah Durranis death, his grandsons were invited by Tipu Sultan to come to the rescue of the Muslims of Hindustan from the growing power of the British East India Company.^[18] The battle is commemorated South of Panipat town, where the government of Haryana has erected a war memorial, marking the spot from where Sadashiv Bhau watched the battle.

Historian T S Shejwalkar has argued that the battle was fought to save Mughal dynasty and Marathas sacrificed themselves for the cause of Taimur's successors. He further argues that if Jawaharlal Nehru had shown willingness for similar sacrifice, India may not have been divided in 1947.

Notes and references

See also

• Sadashivrao Bhau
• Bhopal
• Scindia
• Zamzama
• Ranjit Singh
• Rohillas
• Mahadji Shinde
• Balaji Baji Rao
• Shah Alam II

•  • [ e]       Mughal Empire (1526 - 1857)
Emperors:	Babur - Humayun - Akbar - Jahangir - Shah Jahan - Aurangzeb - Lesser Mughals
Events:	First battle of Panipat - Second battle of Panipat - Third battle of Panipat
Architecture:	Humayun's Tomb - Agra Fort - Badshahi Mosque - Lahore Fort - Red Fort - Taj Mahal - Shalimar Gardens - Pearl Mosque - Bibi Ka Maqbara - See also
Adversaries:	Ibrahim Lodhi - Sher Shah Suri - Hemu - Shivaji - Guru Gobind Singh

Further reading

• Panipat, Battles of. (2007). Britannica Retrieved May 24, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online.
• Panipat 1761 by T S Shejwalkar
• Panipat. A novel by Vishwas Patil based on the 3rd battle of Panipat

External links

• Panipat War memorial Pictures
• With Scindia to Delhi 1890 Rudyard Kipling
• The Maratha community
• The Saraswathi Mahal Library at Thanjavur
• District Panipat
• Was late medieval India ready for a Revolution in Military Affairs?- Part II Airavat Singh
• Invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali
• Detailed genealogy of the Durrani dynasty
• Famous Diamonds: The Koh-I-Noor
• Rampur
• Historical maps of India in the 18th century

.Timur Shah Durrani,^[2] the son and viceroy of the Afghan ruler, Ahmad Shah Abdali. This was the high-water mark of the Maratha expansion, where the boundaries of their empire extended in the north to the Indus and the Himalayas, and in the south nearly to the extremity of the peninsula. This territory was ruled through the Peshwa, who talked of placing his son Bishvas Rao on the Mughal throne.^[19] However Delhi still remained under the nominal control of Mughals, key Muslim intellectuals including Shah Waliullah and other Muslim clergy in India and Punjab were alarmed at these developments. In desperation they appealed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the ruler of Afghanistan, to halt the threat.^[20]

Prelude

Main article: Durrani Empire

Ahmad Shah Abdali (referred to in books as "The Abdali") angered by the news from his son and his allies was unwilling to allow the Marathas spread go unchecked. In 1759 he raised an army from the Pashtun tribes with help from the Baloch and his Rohilla ally Najib Khan. By the end of the year they had reached Lahore as well as Delhi and defeated the smaller enemy garrisons. Ahmed Shah, at this point, withdrew his army to Anupshahr, on the frontier of the Rohilla country, where he successfully convinced the Nawab of Oudh Shuja-ud-Daula to join his alliance against the Marathas.

Nanasaheb Peshwa, of the Marathas.

"The lofty and spacious tents, were lined with silks and broadcloths,
were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a distance.....
Vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses,
magnificently caparisoned .... seemed to be collected from every
quarter .... it was an imitation of the more becoming and
tasteful array of the Mughuls in the zenith of their glory."
describing the Maratha Army; by Grant-Duff^[21]

The Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau (referred to as the Bhau or Bhao in sources) responded to the news of the Afghans return to North India by raising an even bigger army and marched North. The Bhau's force was bolstered by some Mahratta forces under Holkar, Scindia, the Gaikwar, Gobind Pant, contingents of the Rajputs and Suraj Mal of the Jats. This combined Army of over 100,000 regular troops captured the Mughal capital Delhi from a small Afghan garrison in December 1759, the Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city and is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwas son Viswas Rao on the Mughal throne. The Sikhs and Jats (with the exception of Ala Singh, the first Maharaja of Patiala) did not support the Marathas because of their refusal to sack Delhi, which was at that time a Maratha protectorate, and their only source of supplies in the north. Their withdrawal from the ensuing battle was to play a crucial role in it's result.

Initial Skirmishes

“The Shah is said to have recited some verses of the Holy Quran,
and, having blown them on an arrow, discharged from his quiver into the river.
Raising then the cry “Bismillah-i-Allah-o-Akbar” meaning,
‘in the name of God the great God’ he plunged into the river,
followed by his bodyguards and the troops.”
One report of Ahmad Shah's crossing of the Jamuna river the crossing ^[22]

With both sides poised for battle there followed much manoeuvring, with skirmishes between the two Armies fought at Karnal and Kunjpura. In Kunjpura on the banks of the Yamuna River, sixty miles to the north of Delhi, was next stormed by the Marathas and the whole Afghan garrison was killed or enslaved^[23] Ahmad Shah encamped on the left bank of the Yamuna River, which was swollen by rains was powerless to aid the garrison. The massacre of the Kunjpura garrison, within the sight of the Durrani camp, exasperated him to such an extent that he ordered crossing of the river at all costs.^[24] The Ahmed Shah and his allies on 17 October 1760, broke up from Shahdara; marching South and between the 23rd and 25th effected a crossing at Baghpat, a small town about twenty-four miles up the river unopposed by the Marathas who were still preoccupied with the sacking of Kunjpura.

After the Marathas failed to prevent Abdali's forces crossing the Yamuna river, they set up defensive works in the ground near Panipat, thereby blocking Ahmad's access back to Afghanistan just as his forces blocked theirs to south. However in the afternoon of the 26th, Ahmad Shah's advance guard reached Sambalka, about half-way between Sonpat and Panipat, where they encountered the vanguard of the Mahrattas. A fierce skirmish ensued, in which the Afghans lost a thousand men, killed and wounded, but drove back the Mahrattas to their main body, which kept on retreating slowly for several days. This led to the partial encirclement of the Maratha army. In skirmishes that followed, Gobind Pant Bundela, with 10,000 light cavalry on a foraging mission, was surprised and slain by an Afghan force near Meerut. This in turn was followed by the loss of another 2,000 Maratha soldiers, who were delivering salaries for the soldiers from Delhi. This completed the encirclement, Ahmad Shah had cut off the Maratha Army's supply lines.

With supplies and stores dwindling, tensions also rose in the Maratha camp as the mercenaries in the Maratha army were complaining of lack of pay. Initially the Marathas then moved in almost 150 pieces of modern long-range rifled French-made artillery. With a range of several kilometres, these guns were some of the best of the times. Their plan was to lure the Afghan army to confront them while they had close artillery support.

Nawab of Awadh (Oudh), Shuja ud Daulah

Siege of Panipat

During the next two months of the siege constant skirmishes and duels took place between parties and individual champions upon either side. In one of these Najib lost 3,000 of his Rohillas, and was very near killed himself. Facing a seeming stalemate the Bhau decided to seek terms, which Ahmad Shah was willing to grant depending on the agreement of his allies. However Najib Khan delayed any chance of an agreement with an appeal on both religious grounds and threw doubt into whether the Marathas would honour any agreement.

The Marathas, difficulty in securing supplies, worsened as the local population became hostile to them. As after becoming increasingly desperate for supplies, they had pillaged the surrounding areas.

While Sadashiv Bhau was still eager to make terms, a message was received insisting on going to war and promising that reinforcements were under way. Unable to continue without supplies or wait for the reinforcements any longer, the Bhau decided to break the siege. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Afghans were thoroughly softened up. With the Afghans broken, he would move camp in a defensive formation towards Delhi, where they were assured supplies.

Battle

Formations

The battle zone was probably between Kaalaa Aamb and Sanauli Road of today. The Afghan lines probably were a few metres to the south of Sanauli road. Maratha lines began a little to the north of Kaalaa Aamb. They had thus blocked the northward path of Abdali's troops and at the same time they themselves were blocked by the latter from the south which was in the direction to Delhi, where they could get badly needed supplies. The Afghans marched in an oblique line, with their left in front, preceded by their guns, small and great. The Bhau, with the Peshwa's son and the household troops, were in the centre. The left wing consisted of the gardis under Ibrahim Khan; Holkar and Sindhia were on the extreme right.

The Maratha line was be formed up some 12 km across, with the artillery in front, protected by infantry, pikemen, musketeers and bowmen. The cavalry was instructed to wait behind the artillery and bayonet wielding musketeers, ready to be thrown in when control of battlefield had been fully established. Behind this line was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle tested, and then the roughly 30,000 civilians entrained. Many were middle class men, women and children on their pilgrimage to the Hindu holy places and shrines, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see Aryavarta (Aryan Land). Behind the civilians was yet another protective infantry line, of young inexperienced soldiers.

On the other side the Afghans formed a somewhat similar line, their left being formed by Najib's Rohillas, and their right by two brigades of Persian troops. Their left centre was led by the two Viziers, Shuja-ud-daulah and Ahmad Shah's Vizier Shah Wali. The right centre consisted of Rohillas, under the well-known Hafiz Rahmat and other chiefs of the Indian pathans. Pasand Khan covered the left wing with a choice body of mailed Afghan horsemen, and in this order the army moved forward, leaving the Shah at his preferred post in the centre, which was now in rear of the line, from where he could watch and direct the battle.

Early phases

Ahmed Shah Durrani, victor of the Third Battle of Panipat.

Before dawn, on January 14, 1761, the Maratha troops broke their fast with the last remaining grain in camp, and prepared for combat; coming from their lines with turbans dishevelled and turmeric-smeared faces. The Maratha forces emerged from the trenches, pushing the artillery into position on their pre-arranged lines, some 2 km from the Afghans. Seeing that the battle was on, Ahmad Shah positioned his 60 smoothbore cannon and opened fire. However, because of the short range of the Afghan weapons and the static nature of the Maratha artillery, the Afghan cannons proved ineffectual while Maratha artillery went over the Afghans' heads and inflicted very little damage.

The initial attack was led by the Maratha left flank under Ibrahim Khan, who in his eagerness to prove his worth; advanced his infantry in formation against the Rohillas and Shah Pasand Khan. The first Afghan attacks were broken by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some famed Gardi musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos were fired at point blank range into the Afghan ranks. The resulting carnage sent the Rohillas reeling back to their lines, leaving the battlefield virtually in the hands of Ibrahim Khan for the next three hours.

In the second phase, the Bhau himself led the charge against the left of center Afghan forces, under the Afghan Vizier Shah Wali Khan. The sheer force of the attack nearly broke the Afghan lines, and soldiers started to desert their positions amidst the confusion. Desperately trying to rally his forces, Shah Wali appealed to Shuja ud Daulah for assistance. However, the Nawab did not break from his position, effectively splitting the Afghan Army's center. Despite the Bhau's success, the over-enthusiasm of the charge saw many of the half starved Maratha horses exhausted long before they had travelled the two kilometres to the Afghan lines; some simply collapsed. Making matters worse was the suffocating odour of the rotting corpses of men and animals left on the field from the fighting of the previous months.

Final phase

In the final phase the Marathas, under Scindia, attacked Najib Khan (whom he had a personal enimity with). However, Najib successfully fought a defensive action keeping Scindias forces at bay. By this stage at noon it looked as though Bhau would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. The Afghan left flank still held its own under the two; but the centre was cut in two, and the right was almost destroyed. Ahmad Shah had watched the fortunes of the battle from his tent, guarded by the still unbroken forces on his left. But now, hearing that his right was reeling and his center was defeated, he felt that the moment was come for a final effort. In front of him the Hindu cries of "Har! Har! Jai Mahadeo!" were maintaining an equal and dreadful concert with those of "Allah! Allah! Din! Din!" from his own side.

Ahmad Shah sent his body guards to call up his reserves of 15,000 highly trained troops from his camp and arranged it as a column in front of his cavalry of musketeers (Qizilbash) and swivel mounted cannons (shaturnals) on the back of camels. The shaturnals, because of their positioning on camels, could fire an extensive salvo over the heads of their own infantry and at the Maratha cavalry. The Maratha cavalry were unable to withstand the rifled muskets and camel-mounted swivel cannons of the Afghans. Ahmad Shah had 2,000 such shaturnals. They could be fired without the rider having to dismount and were especially effective against fast moving cavalry. He therefore sent 500 of his own body-guards with orders to arise all able-bodied men out of camp, and send them to the front at any cost. he sent 1,500 more, to encounter those who were fleeing, and slay without pity any who would not return to the fight. These extra troops, along with 4,000 of his reserve troops, went to support the broken ranks of the Rohillas on the right. The remainder of the reserve, 10,000 strong, were sent to the aid of Shah Wali, still labouring unequally against the Bhao in the centre of the field. These mailed warriors were to charge with the Vizir in close order, and at full gallop. As often as they charged the enemy in front, the chief of the staff and Najib were directed to fall upon either flank.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond to the Shauthurnals and the cavalry charge. Some 7,000 Maratha cavalry and infantry were killed before the hand to hand fighting began at around 14:00. By 16:00 the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afghan reserves, protected by armoured leather jackets.

Maharaja Surajmal

Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, could not move forward his young soldiers as reserves from behind and felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and lead the battle at the head of the troops. Some Maratha soldiers, seeing that their general had disappeared from his elephant, panicked and began to flee. Vishwasrao, the son of Prime Minister Nanasaheb, had already fallen to a shot in the head. Sadashivrao Bhau and his loyal bodyguards fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot out from under him. The Afghan cavalry charged the soldiers turning the retreat into a rout.

Reasons for the outcome

The main reason for the failure of Marathas was that they went to war without good allies. Though their infantry was based on European style contingent and had some of the best French made guns of the times. Their artillery was static and lacked mobility against the fast moving Afghan forces.^[25] They failed to acquire allies in North India. Their earlier hegemonistic behavior and their political ambitions which led them to loot and plunder, had antagonized all the other powers. They had interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajputana states (present day Rajasthan) and levied heavy taxes and huge fines on them. They had also made huge territorial and monetary claims upon Awadh. Their raids in the Sikh territory had angered the Sikh chiefs whilst some of the Sikh cheifs like Ala Singh of Patiala were working with the Abdali and were subservient to him. Similarly the Jat chiefs, on whom also they had imposed heavy fines, did not trust them. They had, therefore, to fight their enemies alone, except for the weak support of Imad -ul-Mulk. Moreover, the senior Maratha chiefs constantly bickered with one another. Each one of them had ambitions of carving out their independent states and had no interest in fighting against a common enemy.

By contrast the Afghans as many historians point out started the battle with many disadvantages, they were in hostile territory which is not so as he had visited Delhi number of occasions from time of Nadir Shah’s invasion of Delhi from 1737 as a commander in Iranian army & was well aware of terrain, though initially outnumbered Ahmed Shah Abdali achieved numerical superiourity in force by forming alliance using cunning political acumen of his trusted ally Najib Khan Rohilla with Shuja Ud Daula –Naw