Information about Mutually Assured Destruction

Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the very same weapons. The strategy is effectively a form of Nash equilibrium, in which both sides are attempting to avoid their worst possible outcome — nuclear annihilation.

Theory

The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured destruction. It is now generally assumed that the nuclear fallout or nuclear winter resulting from a large scale nuclear war would bring about worldwide devastation, though this was not a critical assumption to the theory of MAD.

The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with secondary forces (second strike) resulting in the destruction of both parties. The payoff of this doctrine is expected to be a tense but stable peace.

The primary application of this doctrine started during the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, and as of 2007 the U.S. and Russia (former USSR) are on relatively cordial terms, the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction certainly continues to be in force although it has receded from public discourse.

Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full scale nuclear exchange (as a functioning state). Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile silos, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

This MAD scenario is often known by the euphemism nuclear deterrence. The term deterrence was first used in this context after World War II; prior to that time, its use was limited to legal terminology.

History

Pre-1945

Perhaps the earliest reference to the concept comes from the English author Wilkie Collins, writing at the time of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870: "I begin to believe in only one civilising influence - the discovery one of these days of a destructive agent so terrible that War shall mean annihilation and men's fears will force them to keep the peace".

Echoes of the doctrine can be found in the first document which outlined how the atomic bomb was a practical proposition. In March 1940, the Frisch-Peierls memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combatting an enemy with nuclear weapons.

Early Cold War

In August 1945, the United States accepted the surrender of Japan after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Four years later, on August 9, 1949, the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons. At the time, both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the Convair B-36, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States was one of "massive retaliation", as coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union truly developed an understanding of the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic missile submarine forces, and work on Soviet ballistic missile submarines began in earnest. For the remainder of the Cold War, although official positions on MAD changed in the United States, the consequences of the second strike from ballistic missile submarines was never in doubt.

The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one ICBM could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could only be counted on to destroy one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest U.S. MIRVed missiles, the LGM-118A Peacekeeper, could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around 300 kilotons - all together, an explosive payload equivalent to 230 Hiroshima-type bombs. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the technology available, leaving only the threat of retaliatory attack as a viable defensive option. MIRVed land-based ICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. It is because of this that this type of weapon was banned under the START II agreement.

In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO planned to use tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of nuclear weapons against Soviet forces, tactical or otherwise, was grounds for a full-scale Soviet retaliatory strike. As such, it was generally assumed that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.

Second strike capability

It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines, starting with the George Washington class in 1959, that a survivable nuclear force became possible and second strike capability credible. This was not fully understood until the 1960s when the strategy of mutually assured destruction was first fully described, largely by United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

In McNamara's formulation, MAD meant that nuclear nations either had first strike or second strike capability. A nation with first strike capability would be able to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another nation and thus prevent any nuclear retaliation. Second strike capability indicated that a nation could uphold a promise to respond to a nuclear attack with enough force to make such a first attack highly undesirable. According to McNamara, the arms race was in part an attempt to make sure that no nation gained first strike capability.

An early form of second strike capability had already been provided by the use of continual patrols of nuclear-equipped bombers, with a fixed number of planes always in the air (and therefore untouchable by a first strike) at any given time. The use of this tactic was reduced however, by the high logistic difficulty of keeping enough planes active at all times, and the increasing priority given to ICBMs over bombers (which might be shot down by air defenses before reaching their targets).

Ballistic missile submarines established a second strike capability through their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary—it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile bunker with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were a credible means for retaliation even after a massive first strike.

Late Cold War

The original doctrine of U.S. MAD was modified on July 25, 1980, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter's adoption of countervailing strategy with Presidential Directive 59. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Russian population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction of the USSR (and the United States). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan Administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the U.S.

SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Margaret Thatcher) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If America had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first strike capability which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist Andrei Sakharov) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications.

Post Cold War

The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced tensions between Russia and the United States and between the United States and China. The administration of George W. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002, claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they propose to build is designed only to prevent nuclear blackmail by a state with limited nuclear capability and is not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have improved and a nuclear exchange is increasingly unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the post Cold War era has had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. An article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that U.S. is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.^[1]

However, in a followup article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record."^[2] Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait".

As usual, a situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries, since Russia might feel forced to attempt a similar action first.

An outline of current United States nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence" in 1995.

Official policy

Whether MAD was the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The term MAD was not coined by the military but was, however, based on the policy of "Assured Destruction" advocated by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the 1960s. The United States Air Force, for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD and that this form of deterrence was seen as one numerous options in U.S. nuclear policy. Former officers have emphasized that they never felt as limited by the logic of MAD (and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in smaller scale situations than "Assured Destruction" allowed), and did not deliberately target civilian cities (though they acknowledge that the result of a "purely military" attack would certainly devastate the cities as well). MAD was implied in several U.S. policies and used in the political rhetoric of leaders in both the U.S. and the USSR during many periods of the Cold War.

Criticism and challengeable assumptions

Critics of the MAD doctrine note the similarity between the acronym and the common word for mental illness. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence depends on several challengeable assumptions:

Second-strike capability

• A first strike must not be capable of preventing a retaliatory second strike or else mutual destruction is not assured. In this case, a state would have nothing to lose with a first strike; or might try to preempt the development of an opponent's second-strike capability with a first strike.

Perfect detection

• No false positives (errors) in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side. The implication of this is that an accident could lead to a full nuclear exchange. During the Cold War there were several instances of false positives, as in the case of Stanislav Petrov.
• No possibility of camouflaging a launch.
• No alternate means of delivery other than a missile.
• Perfect attribution. If there is a launch from the Sino-Russian border, it could be difficult to distinguish which nation is responsible and, hence, which nation to retaliate against.

Perfect rationality

• No "rogue states" will develop nuclear weapons. Or, if they do, they will stop behaving as rogue states and subject themselves to the logic of MAD.
• No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process.
• All leaders with launch capability care about the survival of their subjects.
• No leader with launch capability would strike first and gamble that the opponent's response system would fail.
• No person possessing nuclear weapons capability will have a belief system that offers him peace and reward in an afterlife if he dies in a nuclear war of his own volition or will have any other moral or religious belief that makes mutual annihilation an acceptable or even preferable outcome.

Inability to defend

• No shelters sufficient to protect population and/or industry.
• No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear.

Pakistan and India

India and Pakistan are currently in a situation of mutually assured destruction. Both countries possess powerful nuclear weapons which can cause large scale destruction; this did not, however, prevent the Kargil war in 1999. Whether MAD has been responsible for current peace in the region has been a topic of debate.

In early 2007, it was estimated that both nations had enough nuclear weapons in their respective arsenals to attack every major city of the other nation. It is estimated that India has around 90-140 nuclear weapons while Pakistan is estimated to have between 10-15 nuclear weapons. However, Pakistan's nuclear capabilities are unsure because in 2006 a new nuclear plant was opened in the Islamic Republic that could produce over 5 nuclear warheads per year. Pakistan is also said to have developed a MIRV system for their missiles. India has also been rumored to have successfully constructed an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system.

See also

• Absolute war
• Assured destruction
• Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• Balance of terror
• Cold War
• counterforce
• Deterrence theory
• Doomsday clock
• Doomsday device
• , a famous 1964 Stanley Kubrick film that satirizes the MAD situation.
• Essence of Decision, a book which disputes the MAD doctrine
• Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence
• Fail-deadly
• Fail-Safe, a second film that takes a more serious view of the MAD situation.
• First strike
• Force de frappe
• Game theory
• Herman Kahn
• John von Neumann
• Launch on warning
• Massive retaliation
• Moral Equivalence
• Nuclear-free zone
• nuclear disarmament
• Nuclear missile defense
• Nuclear utilization target selection (NUTS)
• Nuclear Strategy
• Nuclear Weapon
• On Thermonuclear War Herman Kahn's book on thermonuclear deterrence.
• RAND Corporation
• Red Alert, the Peter George book upon which Dr. Strangelove is based.
• Second Strike
• Suicide weapon
• Stanislav Petrov, Soviet colonel who may have averted a nuclear war
• Strategic Defense Initiative
• Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
• The Butter Battle Book
• WarGames, presented MAD by juxtaposing human fear with computed game theory
• Weapons of Mass Destruction

References

People vs The Bomb: Showdown at the UN - One-hour TV report on 2005 NPT Review -Google Video [1]

External links

• Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy" from Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006
• In the Shadow of MAD, an article critical of the idea of MAD as US policy.
• Herman Kahn's Doomsday Machine
• Excerpts of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks, 1986 (regards SDI as a threat to MAD)
• Robert McNamara's "Mutual Deterrence" speech from 1967
• Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
• Council for a Livable World
• Nuclear Files.org Mutual Assured Destruction